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     Abstract  
This thesis investigates the effect of exchange   controls   on trade of the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC). Restrictions on foreign exchange should be 
adjusted (liberalised to an extent) in order to harmonise policies between members, as an 
important part of the regional integration plan, which aims at the creation of a 
Monetary Union by 2018. The first step taken to examine the collateral effect of this on 
trade involves the construction of a new index, measuring exchange control restrictiveness 
(ECRI) across SADC countries over the last 10 years, based on the IMF’s Annual Report 
on Exchange Arrangements (AREAR). The index is disaggregated into 5 sub-categories 
to inform the subject further. A brief  analysis  of these  indices  precedes their insertion into  
an  augmented gravity model  of trade for 10 years,  constituting the  second  part of the 
paper. Estimating the panel gravity model using Ordinary Least  Squares  (OLS)  and Poisson  
pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) techniques, reveals that exchange controls  effectively 
act as non-tariff trade barriers and, as such, the easing of overall exchange controls  will not  
only facilitate policy coordination among  member  states, but  should  also liberalise 
SADC trade. This effect is especially pronounced when considering controls related to current 
account transactions.  
 
 
1 Introductio  
 
The  desire  to  form an  African  Common  Market and  Economic  Community (AEC)  was  
introduced  in the  1980 Lagos Plan  of Action,  reiterated in the  1991 African  Economic  
Treaty, and again in the 2000 Constitutive Act of the African Union.  The plan is proposed to 
come to fruition by 2023, and  seeks to reverse the  continent’s  historically  poor growth  
performance given its  vast  natural resources  and  strategic geographic  positioning  (Collier  
and  Gunning, 1999).  The marginalisation of African  trade within a  global context has  been  
viewed as a key explanation for the  stagnant  growth  performance  of the  past,  and  underlies  
the  motivation for the  African  regional  integration since 1910. The promotion of intra-African 
trade is essential in achieving the goal of a continent-wide common market that requires each 
bloc to first and foremost establish itself as a Free Trade Area (FTA).  
∗ This paper forms the minor dissertation component towards a Masters of Commerce in Economics at the School of 
Economics, University of Cape Town. Special thanks to Dr. Mark Ellyne and Rachel Chater for their help in coding the 
ECRI. It is important to note that, in this paper, the term “exchange controls” generally refers broadly to either current 
account or capital account restrictions, unless otherwise specified.  
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The benefits of FTAs are especially appealing among groups of African countries, which are 
characteristically small, dispersed and diversified (Meyer et al, 2010). Broader groups of 
countries generate more domestic competition in larger markets, where economies of scale can 
be exploited. They enjoy a more attractive investment environment, benefit from diminished 
transportation costs, as well as coastal access for landlocked countries and increased bargaining 
power, to name but a few advantages (Yang and Gupta, 2008). 
Currently,  the  continent  is home to some 30 official Regional  Trade  Agreements  (RTAs), 
with each country  party  to an average 4 trade  protocols (Yang and Gupta, 2008). This web of 
RTAs is consolidated under the 8 Regional Economic Communities (RECs) of the AEC, one of 
which is the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Despite the disparities between 
the RECs in terms of their individual progress to FTA status, the participating countries 
soldier on towards the goal of continent-wide integration.  One such recent goal was set in 
2012, when the African Union Heads of State agreed to establish a continental FTA by 2017, 
open to review subject to progress made. Regardless of the  feasibility (or lack thereof) of this  
plan,  the  process of regional integration within  each REC  remains  beneficial to participating 
countries,  and  impediments to, and consequences of, this process provide extensive 
opportunities for research. 
To this end, this analysis focuses on SADC regional integration and, in particular, how the 
process of liberalising exchange controls to create a common market affects the trade of member 
states.  The SADC regional bloc comprises 15 countries: Angola, Botswana, the Democratic 
Republic  of Congo (DRC),  Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique,  Namibia, 
the Seychelles,  South  Africa,  Swaziland,  United  Re ublic  of Tanzania, Zambia  and  
Zimbabwe.  The bloc represents a market of 273 million people with a GDP  of $575 billion.1  
The SADC regional integration program  was set out in 1993 and includes the establishment 
of a FTA by 2008, a Customs  Union  by 2010, a Common  Market  by 2015 and,  finally, a 
monetary  union and  a single currency  by 2018. Thus far, the  FTA  was launched  on time,  
with  all member states  (except the Seychelles, Angola  and the DRC)  removing  intra-SADC 
tariffs  on 85% of their products.  The SADC boasts  a relatively  high share  of intra-SADC 
trade  at  11% of the  region’s total  trade  (UNCTAD,  2011) and despite fears in some quarters, 
the FTA  is showing promising  signs of integration with the rest of the world and within  the 
region (Edwards  and Behar,  2011). 
The challenge of regional integration begins with the removal of tariff and non-tariff 
barriers to trade among REC members. These trade distortions serve as impediments to SADC 
trade with all of its trading partners, not just intra-regionally. This paper assesses the unique 
theories of Wei and Zhang (2007) and Tamarisa (1999), who propose that, in the global setting, 
various controls on foreign exchange act as non-tariff barriers to trade, with a detrimental effect 
on bilateral flows comparable to that of import tariffs.  Recent research assessing SADC trade  
performance  highlights  the  problems  of under-development of African  infrastructure 
(Portugal-Perez and  Wilson,  2008), the  institutional quality  of a neighbouring  country  
(Behar and Manners, 2010), South  African domination of local industry (Chauvin and  
Gaullier, 2003; Jefferis, 2007) and  the  complexities  and  burden  of preferential  tariff  barriers  
within SADC  countries  (Chauvin  and  Gaullier,  2003; Edwards  and  Behar,  2011).  This list is 
not exhaustive, but highlights t h e  range of obstacles t o  trade in the SADC.  In this  context,  
exchange controls  are just  one of the  numerous  barriers  to trade,  but  must be harmonised  to 
get to a monetary union and a common currency. 
Unlike tariffs,  there  is little  quantitative data  on exchange  controls  by country,  and  the 
main  source  of data  is an  annual  list  of restrictions published  by the  IMF  in their  Annual 
Report on Exchange  Arrangements and Exchange  Restrictions (AREAR).    
 
1 See http://sadc.int.  
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There is a considerable amount of literature assessing the value  and  desirability of the  
liberalisation of exchange  controls towards  global  financial  liberalisation (Bicini, Hutchinson 
and Schindler,  2010),  but quantitative data  has  been limited.  In order to provide  a tool to 
both  compare  countries’  relative  restrictiveness and  to empirically  test  the  effects of this 
restrictiveness, a number  of papers,  including  Wei and  Zhang (2007) and Tamarisa (1999), 
introduce an index based on data  from the AREAR for a number of global countries. Owing to 
the shortcomings and inaccessibility of those indices, a new index of exchange control 
restrictiveness (ECRI) is created here for the SADC countries from 2000 to 2010.  It includes 
scores for sub-categories that reflect the major factors affecting foreign exchange payments 
relating to current and capital ex terna l  a c c o u n t  transactions. 
This  paper  follows the  work of Wei and  Zhang  (2007) and  Tamarisa (1999) by building 
a standard gravity  model  of trade  and  testing  the  newly-constructed ECRI.  The methods 
applied in this paper focus solely on the SADC. The author updates past  research  by applying  
the  extended  gravity  model of trade  that controls  for multilateral resistance  (Anderson  and  
Van Wincoop,  2003) to  the  Poisson  pseudo-maximum likelihood  (PPML) estimation 
technique popularised by Silva and  Tenreyro  (2006; 2009) for comparative purposes.   This 
model has become ubiquitous in recent trade research, given its elimination of key biases 
inherent in traditional methods of gravity model estimation. By incorporating the insights of 
Silva and Tenreyro  (2006; 2009), this  investigation utilises a more robust  and  up-to-date 
methodology to  examine  the  relationship between  exchange  controls  and  trade  in order  to  
test  whether these restrictions should  be added  to the list of barriers  to SADC trade,  as is 
suggested  by the two previous  studies. 
This study finds that elements of the index, though quantitatively small, are significant and 
negative in the gravity model, which implies that SADC exchange controls have, ceteris 
paribus, represented an impediment to average SADC trade over the last 10 years.  Overall 
restrictiveness of exchange controls can be regarded as an additional obstacle to the current 
research on SADC trade barriers, especially the goods and services component of the index.  
Overall, there is evidence to suggest that the liberalisation of these restrictions will have a 
small but nevertheless promotional effect on trade going forward.  This investigation contributes 
to the limited literature on the subject in two apparent ways.  Firstly, the creation  of the  ECRI  
for SADC countries provides  a useful  tool for further  research  in assessing  the  extent of 
exchange  and  capital account restrictiveness in the SADC. Secondly, the application of the  
PPML  gravity  model  is consistent with recent empirical  practices  and thereby  updates the 
methodology  presented  in the mentioned  literature on the subject  of exchange controls  acting  
as a barrier  to trade. 
The  paper  is presented  as follows:  Section  2 and  3 place  the  investigation into  context, 
providing  background on trade in the SADC and the relationship between  trade  and  exchange 
controls  respectively. Section  2 begins by outlining  the  progress  towards a SADC monetary 
union  through an  overview of the  regional institutional developments, recent  trade  history and  
prevalent trade  barriers. Section  3 focuses on exchange  controls  and  their  progress  to 
liberalisation in the SADC, followed by  a review of theoretical and  empirical  literature on 
exchange  controls and  their  effect on trade. Section 4 explains the construction of the ECRI, 
assesses its value in the context of existing indices, and thereafter provides a brief analysis of 
the movements of the index over time. Section 5 presents the empirical model and an analysis of 
the restrictiveness index on SADC trade in various settings, w h i l e  noting the caveats associated 
with the empirical model introduced. Section 6 briefly reviews the results, suggests 
corresponding policy implications, and recommends avenues for future research. 
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2 Trade in the SADC Context 
 
This section  focuses on  the  dynamics  of trade  in  the  SADC  regional  group, firstly  in  the 
context  of the regional integration agenda,  secondly by overviewing recent trade  flows of the 
SADC bloc and,  thirdly,  by a review of prominent impediments  to trade. The establishment 
of a regional FTA and the  promotion  of trade among  members  is coupled with the  pursuit of 
overall  trade as part  of the  general  African  growth  agenda.  To this end, in assessing the trade 
trends of member countries over the last 10 years, this subsection  assesses recent trade 
movements,  signs of trade  integration with  the  world  and  within  the  region,  and  prevalent 
obstacles  to trade  in the form of tariffs and non-tariff  barriers (NTBs). 
 
2.1  Regional Integration Agenda 
 
Table 1 is an overview of the 15-year Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP), 
developed in 2003, that outlines the SADC regional integration agenda. The detailed plan 
contains numerous objectives and strategies for member countries to follow to achieve the MU 
by 2018.  Over the first 5 years of its inception, the SADC has displayed favourable progress in 
attaining these goals. Out of 46 targets, 14% have been fully achieved, 68% partially achieved, 
and 18% not achieved.  Indeed, the first milestone was the establishment of the SADC FTA in 
2008 according to plan. 
 
 
  Table 1: Proposed Stages of a SADC Monetary Union 
 
1 Free Trade Area  FTA  Removal of tariffs on intra-SADC trade 
 
2 Customs Union  CU Uniform tariffs on imports from non-member states 
 
3 Common Market  CM  Free movement of factors of production between members 
Incomplete Monetary 
Union  IMU 
Fixed exchange rates and monetary 
policy coordination 2016 
 
5 Full Monetary Union  MU Single currency under one regional central bank 
 
Source: RISDP (SADC, 2003a), and Tavlas (2008). 
 
 
There is some debate, though, as to whether the due dates assigned to the subsequent steps 
are practical.  For example, the adverse effects of the global crisis from 2009 slowed down 
progress towards  total  trade  liberalisation and made the achievement of a customs  union by 
2010 unfeasible (Mashayekhi  and  Peters, 2012), in turn  delaying  the  movement towards  a 
common market, and so on.  It should be noted that in the face of distinct divergences between 
member countries over macroeconomic indicators, fiscal policies, political agendas, wealth levels 
and institutional strength, it is generally considered highly impractical to encompass all 
countries under a full monetary integration arrangement by 2018 (Jefferis, 2007).2 Neverthe- 
 
2 GDP per capita of member countries ranges from $201 in DRC and  $408 in Mozambique to $7255 in South 
Africa, $7403 in Botswana and  $7488 in Mauritius. The general consensus is that the  process  should follow a 
more  gradual path where  countries  that  demonstrate desirable convergence in  the  areas  of inflation, 
interest rates and  exchange rate  volatility  (Madagascar,  Mauritius,  Mozambique, Seychelles, Tanzania  and  
SACU members) create a “precursor Union”. The remaining countries (Angola, Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe) 
will be excluded until the convergence criteria are acceptably met.  See Jefferis (2007) and Mashayekhi and Peters 
(2012). 
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less, the regional integration process is in motion  and  the  formation  of a SADC FTA is itself 
a commendable  achievement  given the  obviously  desirable  consequences  for trade  generation  
and the significance of its establishment as a step to creating  the African Free Trade  Area by 
2017. 
As of 2012, the region has finalised plans to launch the Tripartite FTA with the Common 
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the East African Community (EAC) by 
2014.  The  combination of these  3 RECs  contains  just under  600 million  people  with  a 
combined GDP of around $1 trillion, covers more than half of Africa’s population and accounts 
for more than half of its GDP.3   The tripartite arrangement is expected to remove intra-regional 
trade  distortions between the three regional groups and to contribute significantly to the goal 
of the continental regional trade  area. The SADC has emerged as Africa’s flagship regional 
trade area, anchored by the robust South African economy and enjoying the stability of its 
member countries.  By 2010, Most-Favoured Nation (MFN) rates have been reduced on 85% of 
member country products and are generally close to zero.  Section 2.3 discusses this in further 
detail. The SADC’s internal trade performance has exceeded that of other RECs, with 11% of 
total SADC trade attributable to intra-SADC trade, whereas it is just 6% in COMESA.  This 
is, of course, a crude indication of regionalism, and cannot necessarily be attributed to the 
creation of the RTA. 
 
2.2 Recent SADC Trade Trends 
 
In  terms  of the SADC’s  overall  trade  performance,   Edwards  and  Behar  (2011)  conclude  
that the  bloc’s trade  is relatively  well-integrated with  the  world  by virtue of the fact  that 
the  growth in bilateral  trade  flows between  1990 and  2008 is reassuringly  consistent with  
global  trade movements.   They  argue  that the  decline  in the  region’s world  share  of trade  
is indicative of  poor economic growth  rather than  structural impediments  to trade  (Edwards  
and  Behar, 2011).4  The SADC’s progress towards trade   openness  is evident  in  the  overall  
composition  of exported  products,  which  is notably  diverse,  as  is their  range  of export  
partners (Edwards and  Behar,  2011).   As shown  in Table  2,  exports  of SADC  countries  
are  concentrated  on destinations in the European  Union (EU) and other  high income OECD  
markets  (Mashayekhi  and Peter , 2012). Between 2005 and 2010 this relationship is on a 
downward trend,  while exports to  Brazil,  Russia,  India  and  China  (BRIC)  have increased  
by more  than  double;  to  30% of total  SADC exports.5   SADC imports  follow  similar trends   
(Mashayekhi  and Peters, 2012). 
The optimistic outlook of overall trade patterns is echoed when looking only at trade 
between SADC members themselves. The recent trade history of the SADC presents a promising 
picture of   intra-regional trade integration in a number of relevant areas (Edwards and Behar, 
2011).  Firstly, Table  2 displays  the  fact  that SADC  intra-regional to  total  trade  ratio  is 
11%, which, when compared to other African RECs, is  high (Mashayekhi a n d  Peters, 2012). 
When controlling  for income disparities (GDP), SADC countries  are trading more with each 
other than  the rest of the world as evidenced by the highly significant,  positive intra-regional 
trade  dummy  in a panel  gravity  equation  (Behar  and  Manners,  2011).  Furthermore, intra-
regional expor t s  a r e  found to be more diversified,   
 
3 See http://sadc.int.  
4 They substantiate their claim by examining SADC merchandise exports as a share of GDP compared to 
other regional groups and by using a gravity model of trade, in which GDP and geography are accounted for 
(Edwards and Behar, 2011). 
5 It should be noted that export markets vary considerably between SADC members.  For example, while 
more than 60% of Botswana’s exports go to the EU, the comparable EU export shares are much lower for 
Swaziland, Tanzania and Zambia. 
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Table 2: Destination composition of SADC exports (percentages) 
 
 2000 2005 2010 
SADC 12.6 9.7 10.9 
Rest  of Africa 2.4 3.1 3.2 
EU 37.9 34.0 23.0 
Other  high income OECD 27.9 29.2 26.4 
BRICs 7.8 13.0 28.8 
Rest  of the World 11.3 11.0 7.7 
Source:  UNCTAD extracted by Mashayekhi and Peters (2012). 
 
 
compared  to  exports to the rest of the world.6   Moreover,  from 1999, high intra-regional trade  
dependence is evident,  most  notably Malawi,  Mozambique,   Zambia  and  Zimbabwe  each  
rely  on  SADC  for  more  than   50% of their  total  imports  and  20% of total  exports,  with  
Zimbabwe  leading  at  90% (Chauvin and Gaullier,  2003). In 2008, the SACU, whose trade  
flows consist mostly of South  African trade,  was responsible  for purchasing  an astounding 
65% of total  intra-regional exports,  and  about  80% of total  intra-SADC imports  came from 
the customs  union (Edwards  and Behar,  2011). 
Though  these  signs are  indicative  of encouraging  trade  integration both  internally  and 
externally, the intra-regional trade  growth rate  is not particularly attractive.  As a proportion 
of total  SADC imports,  imports  from other  SADC countries  has slowed since 1999, increasing 
from 10.2% to a mere 12.5% in 2008, whereas the previous decade saw this proportion double 
from 5.1% in 1990 to  10.2% in 1999 (Edwards  and  Behar,  2011).  Regarding  trade  growth 
within  the  region, Table  2 shows that between  2000 and  2005 intra-SADC trade  proportion 
of total  SADC exports,  relative to total  exports,  has declined to 9.6% from 12.6% and has 
only recovered  by 1 percentage  point over the  subsequent 5 years.  This is mostly due to 
China’s recent dominance of trade to and from the region, which has overshadowed the relative 
growth of intra-SADC trade.   However, this along with  the  fact  that recent gravity  models of 
trade also suggest  the  insignificance  of being  a member  of SADC  as a factor  in boosting  
SADC trade  in a substantial way (Chauvin and Gaullier,  2003; Edwards  and Behar,  2011; 
Mashayekhi  and Peters, 2012) suggests that, despite  established FTA status, the persistence  of 
barriers to regional  trade  is hindering  the efficient  implementation of the  trade  agreement.   
As such, their identification and alleviation of barriers to intra- and extra- SADC trade forms an 
important area of research.7 
 
2.3 Obstacles to SADC Trade 
 
Edwards and Behar (2011) identify 2 avenues through which tariffs have been reformed in 
recent years:  regionally and uni- or multilaterally. In terms of unilateral and multilateral tariff 
reforms, tariff levels are far lower than in the past.   As mentioned in Section 2.1, from 2000, 
leading up to the FTA establishment, MFN rates have been reduced to almost zero.  Tariffs 
have   been   removed on 85% of SADC member products, with sensitive products consisting  
 
6 This   is somewhat corroborated by  a  PRODY  index  that measures that the  sophistication of SADC  
exported goods  is higher for  SADC’s  intra-regional trade  compared to  external trade (Mashayekhi and  
Peters, 2012).   A higher index is related to higher growth rates (Hausmann Hwang and Rodrick, 2007). 
7 Lowering   barriers to  trade  improve both the  volume of  aggregate exports and  the  extent  of  products 
exported (Edwards and  Behar, 2011). 
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of the remaining 15%.8 These were scheduled to be liberalised by 2012, although it is not clear 
whether this timetable will be met.  Among the member states, the liberalisation of tariffs has 
taken place at considerably different rates, as investigated by Mashayekhi and Peters (2012). For  
example, a sizeable  discrepancy exists between  MFN  rates  between  South  Africa and  
Mozambique,  where South  Africa removed most  tariffs  between  2000 and  2005, whereas 
Mozambique,  like other  least  developed  countries  (LDCs),  such  as  Zambia,  generally  only 
introduced  tariff reductions  during  2008 and 2009. Angola and the DRC are expected to join 
the FTA soon and follow suit.  Other  countries,  such as Mauritius, have taken a more gradual 
approach  in reducing  their  tariffs  each  year  between  2000 and  2008.  In general, the more 
developed countries have reduced tariffs at a faster rate.  Each country has its own history of 
tariff rates, which makes it important to focus on more specific analyses of these effects. 
While  regional  tariff  rates  are  declining,  under  Preferential Trade  Agreements  (PTAs) 
member  states  maintain stringent  Rules  of Origin  (ROO)  requirements that have not  been 
effectively consolidated and therefore  inhibit  trade.  Preferential tariffs among SADC member 
states are both restrictive and complex.9 Preferential tariffs in the SADC case, particularly 
their ROO requirements, tend to overlap and undermine the efficiency of regional memberships.  
Essentially, trading partners apply different external tariffs because of their membership of 
different trade agreements. The complexities  involved with various  overlapping  tariffs imposed 
by different regional memberships reduces  the  efficiency of the  memberships  (Edwards  and  
Behar,  2011).  The SADC is involved in PTAs with non-African  countries,  such as the EU, 
through the Everything But Arms (EBA),  under  which all imports  to the EU from the LDCs 
are duty and quota  free, with the  exception  of armaments and  the  US Africa Growth  and  
Opportunity Act (AGOA) between  South  Africa and  the  United  States,  who are granted  
preferential  market  access to imports  of relatively  labour-intensive textile  products  from the  
SADC  region.10  The  single FTA of the Tripartite arrangement hopes to reduce the 
overlapping  membership  problems in the SSA and establish  harmony  in regional integration. 
ROO provisions have been identified as a substantial barrier to SADC trade facilitation. In 
addition to their profound implications on the competitiveness of domestic producers, consumer 
welfare and investment, the R O O  state that only goods originating from participating 
countries are subject to tariff preferences.   They  aim to prevent third  country  imports  from 
entering  a PTA through a lower tariff member  of the  trade  pact  so as to avoid the  payment 
of duties.  They have been found to be more harmful than helpful to African trade flows, 
restricting countries access to these preferential markets and limiting opportunities to diversify 
exports (de Melo and Portugal-Perez, 2009). In SADC, restrictive ROO have been found  to  
limit  the  potential benefits  of preferential  market  access by denying  regional  producers 
access to internationally competitive  inputs  and  raw materials which are likely their best 
hope for becoming globally competitive.  These restrictions have been singled out as the prime 
suspects for the low levels preferential access utilisation to the EU by LDCs (Brenton and 
Manchin, 2002). 
 
8 Sensitive   and   excluded products include motor vehicles   and   vehicle components, and various specified 
clothing items (UNCTAD, 2008). 
9 A PTA is a trade protocol that gives preferential access to certain products from the participating 
countries. To this end, countries become members of a trade pact under which tariffs are reduced but not 
abolished totally under a trade pact. The tariff preference schedules stipulated by these agreements contradict the 
normal trade relations principle of the World Trade Organization (WTO) that requires members to apply the 
same tariff to imports from o t h e r  WTO members. The line  between  a PTA and a FTA  is often  blurred, as  
almost any  PTA has  the  main  goal  of becoming a FTA  in  accordance with the  General Agreement on 
Tariffs  and Trade, forming the  first  step  towards economic integration (Cheong et  al, 2012). 
10 The EBA is part of the EU Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), and aims to encourage the 
development of the world’s poorest countries in particular. 
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Although  the  EBA program  provides  for duty  free imports  for these  countries’  ROO,  
especially those  pertaining to apparel  severely inhibit  imports,  mostly  owing to the  fact  that 
members  often out-source  certain  phases  of production (Cheong and Takayama, 2012).  The 
SADC has already benefitted from the relaxation of the ROO requirements in sourcing inputs 
for clothing exports to the US via AGOA, which generated a substantial increase in clothing 
exports to the region (de Melo and Portugal-Perez, 2009).  Further efforts to alleviate these 
constraints will likely promote trade creation. It is necessary that the SADC reforms these 
regulations to coordinate the tariff schedules faced by SADC members and the restrictiveness 
of them.  Moreover, the costs associated with ensuring that members of the PTAs conform to 
the ROO are burdensome for participating countries (Edwards and Behar, 2011). 
Apart  from tariff-related barriers  to  trade,  “serious  concern”  has  been expressed  at  the 
impact  of non-tariff  barriers  (NTB)  on intra-regional trade.11    Indeed there  exists an array of 
overall trade  obstacles  under  the SADC NTB umbrella. 
Edwards and Behar (2011) test the prevalence of SADC NTBs empirically by assessing the 
significance of being a SADC member on 14 indices, including institutional quality, logistics 
performance and administrative efficiency, while controlling for income and other baseline 
variables.  Angola, Mauritius and Zambia appear to be constrained by logistics costs, and costs 
of importing  and  exporting  are prevalent in Angola, Malawi, CLM and  Zambia, while the 
remaining  member  countries  do not demonstrate unusual  prevalence  of NTBs. The SADC, as 
a whole, is not  found  to  perform  particularly badly  in comparison  to  the  rest  of the  
world, often boasting  fewer obstacles  to  trade,  with  the  regional  dummy  variable  rarely  
significant otherwise. Timeliness and transport and communications infrastructure are, to 
some degree, seen as exceptions  to this.12   Ephraim (2007), on the other hand,  argues that 
compared to other regions, NTBs are markedly prevalent and restrictive with high costs of 
doing business and  excessive procedural  constraints to engaging  in trade  in the  region,  as 
reported  by the World  Bank  (WB)  and Global Competitiveness Reports. 
Infrastructure, in general, is seen as a primary hindrance to intra-regional and intra-African 
trade as a whole (Longo and Sekkat, 2004), with notable under-development of transport 
systems (Portugal-Perez and Wilson, 2008). Furthermore, impediments  to SADC trade include 
neighbouring  countries’  logistical  ineptitude (Behar et  al,  2009) and  the  distortion created 
by  South  Africa’s trade  dominance  in the  region  (Chauvin and  Gaullier,  2003).   A recent 
report  by the World  Bank (2012) highlights  trade  permits,  export  taxes,  import  licenses and 
bans  as hampering  trade  within the SADC.  Many  countries  continue  to  introduce  new 
NTBs, such as restrictions on certain  goods, import  bans  or surcharges,  and  additional 
levies in an often arbitrary and non-transparent manner,  specifically in trade  in agricultural 
goods.  Those associated  with agricultural goods are often cited as necessary  for health  and 
safety reasons, but  relate  in many cases to the  protection of domestic  producers,  which 
result  in distortions to trade.   For example, Erasmus, Flatters and Kirk (2006) illuminate  the  
restrictive NTBs  on wheat  flour trade in the SADC,  such  as in Mauritius, where  all wheat  
flour imports  are  controlled  through its State  Trading Corporation, and  in South  Africa, 
where trade  in wheat  flour is limited  under  the mandate that all domestically  sold wheat 
flour must  be ‘vitamin-enriched’. Indeed, the scope of NTBs in the SADC region seems to be 
extensive. 
As part of the research for their study on SADC exchange control liberalisation, Ellyne and 
 
11 NTBs formed the focus of the SADC Ministerial meeting conducted in Windhoek on 4 March 2011. 
12 These results must be interpreted with caution, given the presence of endogeneity. Nevertheless they provide 
an interesting preliminary overview between potential barriers to SADC  trade and,  more  importantly, highlight 
a need  for  country-specific approaches to the  analysis of SADC  trade barriers, as the  general view can yield a 
distorted impression (Edwards and  Behar, 2011). 
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Letete  (2012) conducted  extensive  meetings  with  representatives of the  SADC private sector,  
which  revealed  that price  and  tax  distortions are  viewed as persistent  impediments to 
trade.   In addition, business  sector  members  in SADC expressed  serious concern  over the 
significance  of governance-type factors  in limiting  trade,   including  corruption, government 
effectiveness,  regulatory quality,  and  political  instability (Ellyne  and  Letete,  2012).   These 
factors  act  as a tax  on cross-border  trade  and  vary  widely among  the  SADC countries,  
although empirical  analysis  on these effects has not yet been conducted. 
Exchange  controls  are  theoretically considered  NTBs  but  are  often  excluded  from  this 
classification  and NTB-related research.  It is likely that the relative  importance of exchange 
controls  as a trade  constraint has diminished  in comparison  to more fundamental constraints 
such  as transportation costs,  ROO,  governance  issues,  and  other  selective  protectionist  
restrictions. Nonetheless, there is no reason to doubt that exchange controls are trade-
reducing, even if their effect cannot be readily isolated from other trade constraints. 
 
 
3 Exchange Controls as Barriers to SADC Trade 
 
Sections 2.2 and  2.3 discussed  tariff and  non-tariff  barriers  (NTBs)  to SADC trade  that 
have been covered  extensively  in the  literature.  Exchange controls can be included as a NTB 
to trade but the research on this subject is limited.  The existing theoretical and empirical 
studies on the relationship between exchange controls and trade flows are explored below.  
Firstly, though, this section briefly outlines the process of liberalising existent exchange controls 
as an important part of the SADC monetary union agenda. Hitherto, no empirical information 
specific to how the adjustment of these controls in the SADC will influence the trade flows of 
member countries exists, a deficit which this paper aims to rectify. 
 
3.1 Exchange Control Liberalisation in the SADC 
 
The path to a full monetary union (MU) requires either the liberalisation of factors of 
production by 2012.   There  must  be free movement  of capital  within  the  region,  although 
there  may be restrictions on capital  leaving the  region, much like a customs  union.  The free 
movement of capital requires capital account liberalisation among the SADC countries or the 
total removal of exchange controls.  The liberalisation is to be coordinated across the SADC 
region and harmonised to the extent that respective currencies are at a fixed convertible rate.  
 As a  corollary,  the  presence  of exchange  controls  is observed  to  exert  an  indirect  
impact  on the effectiveness of monetary policy.  In some cases, restrictive exchange controls 
help sustain parallel  exchange  markets  which,  along  with  the  dollarisation of the  economy,  
reduces  the effectiveness  of monetary policy.  For example, as parallel markets grow and 
dollarisation of the economy rises, so the effectiveness of monetary policy is reduced, with full 
dollarisation representing a complete loss of monetary control (as in Zimbabwe).  Furthermore, 
maintaining a closed capital account is not a feasible way of controlling both monetary policy 
and the exchange rate, as the various leakages in the BOP would undermine the coordination of 
these goals.  Overall, each member state will need to make sure that their policies are 
harmonised with those of other member states, going forward to an MU. 
Global trends  are for the removal of exchange controls, and support  financial liberalisation 
(liberalisation of the  capital  account) (Bincini  et al, 2010), though  SADC member  states  are 
thus  far  not  as  liberalised  as  expected  (Ellyne  and  Letete,   2012).   In  order  to  assess  the 
current restrictiveness of member  countries  quantitatively, we can turn  to the  Chinn-Ito (CI) 
index  of capital  account  openness  measure  that decreases  with  increasing  restrictiveness of 
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the  capital  account (Chinn  and  Ito,  2009).13   If we examine  the  average  level of exchange 
restrictiveness over SADC members compared  to other global groups in Figure 1, it is evident 
that, on average, the  SADC region has one of the  world’s most  closed financial systems,  
only  slightly less restricted than  that of Sub-Saharan Africa, with an average index value   of  
-0.365. Western Europe is comparatively the most liberal region, with a CI index score of 2.22 
in 2010.  This is not  altogether surprising,  given that most  national  governments still  
impose restrictions on capital  mobility  and  foreign exchange  transactions in order  to hinder  
(either temporarily  or permanently) the  process of financial  integration (Orlov, 2005), 
especially in developing countries  (Prasad et al, 2003).14 
In  terms  of movements  in  financial  openness  over  time,  Figure  1 supports   the  notion 
that between  2000 and  2010, global regions including  SADC are endorsing  exchange  control 
liberalisation, though,  relative  to other  groups,  SADC has not made very sizeable progress in 
this  regard.   Indeed,  the  study  of SADC  exchange  control  liberalisation, conducted  in 2012, 
revealed  that only Botswana,  Mauritius, Zambia  and the Seychelles,  constituting a mere  4 
out of the  15 member  states,  had  fully liberalised  their  controls  by that year.15    Given that 
the majority of SADC countries have not removed exchange controls, what are the 
consequences of their  liberalisation as part  of the MU agenda? 
 
 
Figure 1: Financial Openness of SADC compared to their global groups for 2000 and 2010 
Source: Chinn and Ito (2009). 
 
 
3.2 Theoretical Links between Trade and Exchange Controls  
 
Although there is a theoretical basis for doing so, little research has been performed on the 
impact of exchange controls on trade compared with other known NTBs, partly owing to the 
difficulty of measurement. Whereas   trade restrictions in some way curtail exports or imports  
 
13 This presents an  aggregate view of the  overall  financial restrictiveness of SADC  with the  CI index  being 
the  only  other readily available index  relating to  exchange  controls  that spans all  SADC  members over  
a number years. It is discussed further in Section 3.2. 
14 See Johnston and  Tamarisa (1998)  for  a  discussion of controls following  the  Asian  currency crisis and 
Prasad et al  (2003) for a more specific view on net bank lending during this period. 
15 Out of these, Seychelles   only achieved full liberalisation after 2007, according to the study on SADC 
exchange control liberalisation conducted in that year. 
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of goods and services, exchange controls have to do with the payment side of the Balance of 
Payments (BOP) and tend to ration and regulate the right to buy, sell, or use foreign currency 
(Ohlin, 1937).  Limits on foreign exchange transactions corresponding to trade are captured 
by those on the current account restrictions (see Section 4.1).  For example, there may be a 
limit on the amount of foreign exchange permitted to pay for a current import shipment or a 
process of licensing may exist.  While these exchange controls do not directly restrict trade, 
they effectively act as NTBs by creating a generalised tax on exchange related to trade.  The 
liberalisation of exchange controls should facilitate the ease of transactions and the processes 
through which trade linkages are established and exploited.   This has the effect of increasing 
the relative price of imports and/or reducing the quantity of imported goods.  The consequent 
constraint to trade would be substantially amplified in the scenario if partner countries restrict 
imports simultaneously through this mechanism. 
The  substantial barriers  to engaging  in trade  that are associated  with  controls  on foreign 
exchange in trade-related transactions represents  the  most  direct and fundamental link 
between  exchange  controls  and  trade.   There exist a number of more indirect, overlapping 
channels through which this relationship manifests.  Tamarisa (1999) provides a detailed 
outline of the basic transmission mechanisms through which foreign exchange controls can 
affect trade.  These are extended  by other  literature and discussed hereafter  to include the 
effects of reduced  competition, transaction costs,  limits  to financial  intermediation and  
hedging  of exchange  rate  volatility;  the  exchange  rate  and  its volatility;  FDI  and  domestic  
savings and investment. As is evident upon closer inspection of these mechanisms, exchange 
controls can have conflicting effects on trade.   It is important to note that, ultimately, the 
effect on trade by adjustments to foreign exchange and capital restrictions is contingent on 
country-specific profiles, trade structures, and the level of financial integration and other 
factors, which makes it important to test the relationship empirically. 
Exchange controls limit inter-industry competition, which can in turn reduce trade capacity 
and diversity of products. The “infant industry” argument is routinely  cited as a justification 
for exchange  controls,  where trade  barriers  (the  generalised  tax  on imports)  are put  in place 
to  protect a  new,  vulnerable,  or  politically  important industry from  potentially  damaging 
external  competition (Neely, 1999).  However, where the infant industry strategy protects a 
single industry with a tariff, exchange controls act as a more generalised import tax across all 
sectors.  The lack of selectivity makes this argument for exchange controls less effective as it 
will reduce competition on a large scale, which is generally advantageous for the home country 
but potentially detrimental to industry as a whole. Reduced  competition can conceivably 
constrict accessibility  to  production  processes,  which  limits  the  diversity  of producers  and 
products  to be traded. 
The costs associated with exchange controls incurred by businesses and potential traders 
are substantial. Firms  can incur  transaction costs associated  with  the  time  and  capital  
employed in complying with (or evading) restrictions, which could reduce their  ability  to 
engage in trade.  Contrastingly, this, coupled with the presence of high tariffs, can have a 
promotional effect on intra-regional trade in common currency areas (Whitten, 2012). In such a 
scenario, importers may avoid the costs associated with foreign exchange transactions by 
engaging in intra-regional trade instead.  Capital controls can decrease imports by restricting 
the array of financial instruments available as protection against fluctuations in exchange rates, 
which undermine the efficacy of financial intermediation (Edison et al, 2002). Given that 
exchange rate volatility is often viewed as a fundamental concern for importers and exporters 
alike, the limit on financial instruments available for hedging purposes can reduce the appeal 
of engaging in trade at all.  Certain constraints to financial intermediation may also reduce 
financing options for investors, which may discourage trade participation. 
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The exchange rate itself is directly affected by exchange controls, which influences trade 
ambiguously.  On the whole, the  presence  of exchange  controls  is  indicative  of an  overvalued 
exchange,  which acts  as a deterrent to trade.   The  appreciation that often accompanies the  
import  restriction makes  exports  less competitive,  forcing exporters  to  compensate  by 
increasing productivity or reducing  labour costs.  Through this mechanism,  exchange controls 
can  act  as  an  indirect  tax  on  the  labour  content  of exports  (Greenwood  and  Kimbrough, 
1987).  In terms  of exchange rate  volatility, certain  controls  on capital  stabilise  the exchange 
rate  through the  corresponding reduction of speculative  short-term flows (Kose and  Prasad, 
2012).  In turn,  a stable  exchange  rate  theoretically encourages  trade  by reducing  exchange 
rate  risk of foreign investors,  notably  in the financial sectors of developing countries  that lack 
the financial instruments to hedge such risk. 
By encouraging  domestic  saving, capital  controls  can lead to higher  domestic  investment 
in general  (Binici  et al, 2010), though  the  presence  of controls  does not  affect the  soundness 
of investment decisions.    If domestic savings are improved as a by-product, trade can be 
enhanced in cases where domestic investment decisions extend to trade-related institutions and 
infrastructure. Concerning domestic revenue, these controls provide a mechanism through 
which income from foreign origins that enters a country can be taxed, thereby expanding the 
domestic tax base (Bjerksund and Schjelderup, 1995). This associated revenue stream may be 
sufficient enough to prompt governments to reduce tariffs, in turn facilitating trade creation. 
Capital controls can also have an ambiguous effect on trade through their limit of flows of 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).   FDI is restricted when controls pertain   to surrender 
requirements, repatriation of profits and dividends, and foreign investment.  This  can  have 
far-reaching  consequences  on an  economy  as FDI  is widely accepted  as an  essential  means 
of transferring human  capital,  technology,  and of promoting  learning-by-doing across nations 
(Alfaro et al, 2004). Accordingly, FDI flows can act as a useful impetus to trade and, if limited, 
can impede trade enhancement considerably.   On the  other  hand,  discouraging  FDI  through 
restrictions can  lead  to  increased  export  activity  through the  tradeoff  between  tariffs  and 
controls. High tariffs on trade often steer investors towards engaging in FDI instead.   
Conversely, when FDI is heavily restricted by controls, international investors may choose to 
export as an alternative, despite the presence of tariffs. 
 
3.3 Empirical Effect of Exchange Controls on Trade 
 
The  theoretical basis for a relationship to exist between  exchange  controls and  trade  is sup- 
ported empirically  in recent research  by Wei and  Zhang  (2007) and  Tamarisa (1999).  Both 
papers find that foreign exchange controls and capital restrictions act as a hindrance to global 
trade flow, with a restrictive effect comparable to that of tariffs.  Firstly,  both  papers  create 
an index using the  IMF’s AREAR.16   Secondly, the  index is inserted  into a gravity  model of 
trade  as a regressor,  and  its effect on bilateral  trade  is compared  to measures  of tariffs and, 
in the  analysis  by Wei and  Zhang  (2007),  NTBs.   Though  these  steps  are  common  to both 
papers,  the methodological  approach  and results  of each paper illuminates a different aspect 
of the research  and helps to shape our present investigation. 
Tamarisa (1999) faces data limitations and consequently  performs a cross-sectional analysis 
for the  year  1996 and  only  includes  the  index  of controls  for 40 countries.    The  index  is 
constructed for the  current and  capital  account respectively and  then  averaged  over the  two 
in order  to create  an ‘overall’ index.   These indices are then introduced one-by-one into the 
 
16 This AREAR comprises the compilation of 196 countries’ exchange controls over the last 40 years. 
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basic gravity model measuring bilateral exports, along with a measure of average tariffs, which, 
combined with the restrictiveness indices, capture comparable measures of distortions to trade. 
This investigation was extended  almost a decade later by Wei and Zhang (2007) by expanding 
the  coverage of trading partners and  years,  the  empirical  model  and  the  extensiveness  of 
robustness  checks.   Tamarisa’s (1999) gravity mode l  is applied t o  a panel setting i n  which 
the exchange control restrictiveness index covers an extensive 149 countries.  In addition, the 
authors include an NTB index constructed by the IMF. 
Furthermore, the estimation process is updated by incorporating the insights of Anderson 
and van Wincoop (2003) and Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (HMR) (2005; 2008). Anderson 
and van Wincoop (2003) proposes that ordinary  Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) models (such 
as that by Tamarisa (1999) should  include  fixed effects in order  to account for multilateral 
resistance  or relative trade costs of trade partners that are found to be key in determining  trade 
flows through both  the  intensive  and  extensive  margins  of trade.   In addition, the OLS 
model also ignores zero trade flows and the heterogeneity of firms participating in trade, 
which results in sample selection bias and inconsistent estimates respectively. The HMR model 2-
step  model overcomes these flaws (Helpman et al, 2005; 2008) and is applied  by Wei and Zhang 
(2007).17   This  model has been disputed in recent years, especially in the  panel  setting,  
where a probit specification will generate  incidental  parameter problems  (Greene,  2003). 
The  results  of the  baseline  model  point  to  the  fact that exchange  controls  can  
significantly hinder the  flow of trade  between  countries,  especially in the  case of capital  
controls  in developing  countries.  It is argued that while industrial countries  are  more  
financially  open, developing  and  transitional economies maintain more stringent exchange  
controls  and  their effect on trade  is accordingly  substantial.  This is consistent with other 
empirical literature (Prasad et al, 2003).  Contrastingly, countries included in the sample seem 
to boast comparatively open current accounts as corresponding controls are not found to 
present a significant barrier to trade.   The aggregate restrictiveness index is shown to embody 
a consistently significant barrier to bilateral trade over a number of model specifications.  
Overall, Tamarisa’s (1999) paper provides a useful preliminary methodology to encapsulate the 
relationship between trade and exchange controls. 
Overall Wei and Zhang (2007) corroborate the conclusion of Tamarisa (1999), to find that 
there is strong and significant evidence in support of exchange controls as a constraint to trade. 
Namely, an increase of one standard deviation in the exchange control index relating to trade 
payments and other forex transactions (not related to trade or capital) has a comparable trade 
effect to a hike in tariffs by 13.9% and 11.3% respectively.  Contrary to Tamarisa (1999), Wei 
and Zhang (2007) stress the NTB effect of foreign exchange restrictions that do not pertain to 
the capital account transactions. The  inhibiting effect on trade  is most  substantial in the case 
of controls  on export  receipts  and  import  payments.18 Furthermore, trade flows in less 
developed  and more corrupt countries  tend to be constrained to a marginally greater extent than 
those in more developed and less corrupt countries. 
These papers provide a solid foundation on which to build this investigation. Apart from 
these two analyses, there is no direct research on the effect of exchange controls on trade.  Both 
Wei and Zhang (2007) and Tamarisa (1999) present results relating to an average relationship 
 
17 The first step involves the inclusion of a selection variable that captures the likelihood of firms engaging in 
trade in a probit model.  Thereafter, the  fitted errors  are included in  a  second  gravity estimation in  the 
form  of an inverse-mills ratio thereby controlling for the  endogenous decision  to engage  in trade (Helpman et 
al, 2008). 
18 Only when examining the case of emerging markets during the Asian-Latin-American financial crisis, when 
countries reacted by increasing controls, are capital controls presented as a statistically significant barrier to 
trade (Wei and Zhang, 2007). 
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over a number of global countries, whereas this paper identifies relationships specific to SADC 
countries.  It is useful to examine this in the SADC context, given the focus on trade expansion 
goals.   A notable  methodological  contribution to  the  literature discussed  is the  application 
of the increasingly  popular  Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) estimation method, 
popularised  by  Silva and  Tenreyro  (2006,  2009),  as a robustness  check to  the  OLS model 
estimates.   The PPML model corrects zero-trade and sample selection problems that the HMR 
model aims to do, but in a way that is less problematic in the panel setting.  In addition, the  
technique  avoids  the  log-linearisation of the  model  and  thereby  presents  unbiased  and 
consistent results  even when the error term depends on regressors. 
 
4 Exchange Controls Index for SADC (ECRI) 
 
In light of the comprehensive  empirical measures detailing  the exchange control restrictiveness 
of SADC  members,  part  of this  paper  involved the  creation  of an  up-to-date, standardised 
index  (ECRI). This  section  begins  by  briefly  stating the  theory  of exchange  controls,  the 
tradeoffs  involved  with  creating  indices  to  measure  their  restrictiveness, and  measures  that 
inform  this  paper.   The ECRI created is then explained and illustrated by an examination of 
cross-country restrictiveness over the last 10 years.  It appears to vary significantly across 
countries and time, and seems to accurately reflect exchange control policies pursued by SADC 
countries. 
 
4.1 Measuring Exchange Controls 
 
The current and capital account line items of the Balance of Payments (BOP) may be re- 
stricted by exchange controls that cover various aspects of each account.  A country’s BOP 
records all transactions between residents and non-residents.  Current account transactions 
address payments related to trade, factor incomes and financial transfers for the country.  The 
capital account on the other hand captures changes in the ownership of domestic and foreign 
assets.  Movements  in financial flows, such as foreign direct  investment (FDI), portfolio  
investment, other  investment (like bank  borrowing  or lending)  and  reserve account 
transactions are all recorded  in this  part  of the  BOP  (Krugman and  Obstfeld,  2009).  While 
exchange  controls  affect both  the  current and  capital  accounts,  capital  controls  restrict and 
regulate  cross-border  capital  transactions only (Kose and Prasad, 2012).19 
Controls on current and capital transactions can assume a number of different forms.  These 
range from limits relating to timing or reporting to requirements of licensing or permission 
from relevant authorities. They can also denote limitations on quantities or even ban certain 
transactions altogether. Three characteristics are common to most controls.  That is that 1) 
they are linked to a specific line item  within  the  BOP, 2) they  differentiate between residents 
and  non-residents and  finally, 3) they  account for the  direction  of the  flow into or out of the 
country.  Since 1950, the IMF has compiled a database of controls for each of its 187 member 
countries, which is reported in the AREAR.  In order  to analyse  the  degree of restrictiveness 
imposed on foreign exchange transactions, authors have turned to the  codification  of indices 
that capture the  prevalence  of the  controls  and  their  relative  restrictiveness.20     There  are 3 
main issues that need to be considered when creating  such an index:  1) the detail included  in 
 
19 Once again, it should be noted that, in this paper, the term exchange controls refers broadly to either current account or 
capital account restrictions.  
20 See Chater (2012) for  a  comprehensive consolidation of some  of the  existing  measures and indices created 
over the years. 
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the codification, 2) the coverage of the index and 3) whether the  index will capture de facto 
Or de jure controls.  Measures based on the AREAR reflect de jure measures.21 
A downfall of these  types of measures  is their  inability  to assess the  effectiveness of the 
enforcement  of controls  which motivates  a deviation  from AREAR-based restrictions to  de 
facto  measures  that capture actual  capital  flows.  These, however, do not account for actual 
policies. Nor do they reflect subtle aspects of exchange policy such as attitudes towards 
controls and future intentions.   For  advanced  economies, the  correlation is high between  de 
jure  and de facto  indices,  whereas  the  difference between  these  2 types of restrictiveness 
measures  is large for developing  countries  (Prasad et al, 2003).  There is no consensus in the 
literature on which control is more accurate.  Although de jure measures are more popular and 
reliable, de facto measures may prove to be more useful.   Until 1995, restrictions were coded 
in the AREAR as binary variables.   Thereafter, the report became far more extensive and 
included detailed information on each exchange restriction. Many indices  generated 
subsequent  to this  adjustment have  still  opted  to  use a binary  measure  to  account for the  
presence  of a restriction without taking  into  account the  additional information.  However,  
though  more tedious,  increased  disaggregation of the indices is more desirable  as it combats  
the tendency of available aggregated indices to either over- or understate the underlying  
dynamics between the controls  (Schindler,  2009). 
Examples  of these  indices that inform  this  study  are  those  created  by Tamarisa (1999), 
Wei and  Zhang  (2007), mentioned  in the  previous  subsection,  and  Chinn  and  Ito  (2009) 
(see section 3.1 above).  Both Tamarisa (1999) and Chinn  and Ito (2009) follow the de jure 
trends of this  nature, covering 40 countries  over 1 year and  182 countries  over 30 years 
respectively. Both Tamarisa (1999)  and  Wei  and  Zh ng  (2007)  separate the  indices  into  
disaggregated components  with equal weightings  and  also an aggregated index.  For 
Tamarisa (1999) these components  are  controls  related  to  i) current  account  and  ii) capital  
account  transactions. Wei and  Zhang  (2007) separate the  exchange  controls  into  i) trade  
payments  and  outflows ii) foreign exchange  transactions and  iii) capital  transactions. Wei 
and Zhang (2007) do not provide the actual index values used in their paper, nor do they 
specify the period it spans. 
The “new measure of financial openness”, or CI index, was made publically-available i n  
2009.  It  is based  on the  binary  dummy  variables  that codify the  tabulation of restrictions 
on cross-border  financial  transactions reported  in the  AREAR.  The CI index is very useful, 
considering it has been created for all countries in the world, thereby facilitating comparison 
across nations for a number of years.  The CI index puts particular emphasis on the restric- 
tiveness of the latter in order to capture financial restrictiveness specifically.  It is important 
to note that a zero value is assigned to the restricted components, meaning that higher index 
values correspond to higher levels of financial openness (Chinn and Ito, 2009). Furthermore, it 
does not provide a disaggregated version of the index so that the individual categories of 
controls can be analysed.22 
 
21 Share indicators that capture years of liberalisation as a proportion of unliberalised years have also been 
created for a similar purpose (Edison et al, 2002). 
22 The  index  generated and  provided by Schindler (2009)  is very  similar to the  CI index in its  construction, 
the  fact  that it captures financial restrictiveness and  is also  easily-accessible and  spans an  extensive 
number of countries (91)  and  is comparatively more  disaggregated. However, the data does not extend past the 
year 2005 thus it is not included i n  this paper.  See Chater (2012) for correlation information between this index and 
the ECRI. 
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4.2 SADC Exchange Control Restrictiveness Index (ECRI) 
 
Building  on  the  indices  generated by  Wei  and  Zhang  (2007)  and  Tamarisa (1999),  a  new 
exchange control restrictiveness index (ECRI) is constructed to provide an accessible measure 
of comparative and overall restrictiveness across SADC member states,  in order to assess the 
viability  and consequences of the proposed regional integration plan being pursued  within the 
regional  bloc (outlined in Table  1).  In terms  of the  compromises  outlined  above, the  index 
is a de jure  measure,  based  on the  AREAR  and  uses an ordinal  ranking  for each line item 
evaluated.23 This paper presents the ECRI for 11 of the 15 SADC member states for the years 
2000 to 2010.24 
For each country, the same set of 75 key restrictions is coded to create an aggregate score. 
Those  75 restrictions can  be grouped  into  5 broad  categories,  each  of which  forms  its  own 
sub-index,  namely  restrictions on foreign exchange  associated  with  goods, services,  capital, 
the  financial  sector,  and  those  applying  to  all categories,  as  outlined  in Table  3. This 
paper codes each category by assigning  scores ranging  from 0 to  8, depending  on the  type  of 
restriction, as opposed to following the binary  coding system,  which excludes important 
information and oversimplifies  the  extent and  intensity  of controls  and  the  variation 
between  divergent exchange  control  descriptions.  Specifically, at  their  least  restrictive,  a 
limit  is coded as 2 if it is just  a matter of timing  or reporting, and  8 for a quantitative 
restriction. As such, a higher index score denotes a more restrictive policy, opposite to the CI 
index.  See a more detailed description of the index below.25 
As with all methods applied in generating indices, this new methodology is not without its 
caveats.  Firstly, the index generates a downwards bias when line items are missing.   This 
occurs when information on a particular category is not available, reported or applicable, and is 
removed from the overall count.  This lowers the  restrictiveness index count overall, which 
may  provide  a  skewed  vision  of the  exchange  control  openness  of each  country  especially 
in 2000 when  many  fields of information are  reported  missing.   Secondly,  in the  case of a 
quantitative restriction, the  line item  is coded  as an  ‘8’ but  does not  account  for the  fact 
that the  restriction may be binding  but  somewhat generous.  Despite  these  weaknesses,  this  
new index provides  an  ordinal  view of the  restrictiveness of exchange  transactions in SADC  
countries and  reflects  each  country’s  exchange  control  history  quite  closely as  is 
investigated in the section 4.3. 
 
4.3 Analysis of SADC Exchange Control Indices 
 
Table  3 presents  summary  statistics of the  created  index  and  its  5 sub-indices  for 2010.  It 
shows the relative restrictiveness of each category, revealing that the current account is less re- 
strictive than the capital account and financial institutions, as in accordance with expectations. 
Controls on the capital account represent the category with the highest average restrictiveness, 
with restrictions on foreign exchange transactions related to goods being the least restricted. 
Evidently, controls on the current account (captured predominantly by indices on goods and 
 
23 The decision to  create a de  jure  measure requires a taxing codification process  of the  AREAR which  
was conducted in collaboration with  Rachel Chater and Dr. Mark Ellyne. See Chater (2012) for greater detail on the 
motivation behind creating the new index, the construction thereof, and its comparison to other indices. 
24 See Appendix D for the summary statistics of each index category for each country.  Note that  South  Africa  
is the  only  SACU  country included in  our  analysis   to  correspond with  the  trade data used  in  the following  
section. Ultimately, the trade flows of the customs union is adequately represented by those of South Africa. For 
consistency, the exchange controls related to these countries are also excluded. 
25 See Appendix A for more detailed information on the construction of the index outlined by Chater (2012) 
and for a list of the types  of transactions that are listed in the AREAR and subject to controls. 
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services), while boasting t h e  lowest restrictiveness scores, are still prevalent in SADC.  
Restrictions on exchange relating to service transactions varies the most across SADC states 
out of all sub-indices. It is interesting to note that the cross correlation table between sub-
indices (Table 7 in Appendix C) indicates that the more restrictive a country is with regard to 
one control, the more likely it is to be restrictive in other categories.26 
 
 
Table 3: Summary statistics for 2010 
 
Control  Index  Restrictions Mean  Std.  Dev.  Rank 
Goods  12 0.337  0.113  4 
Services  10 0.359  0.272  3 
Capital Account  14 0.415  0.198  1 
Financial  Sector  12 0.363  0.204  2 
Applying  to all  27 0.318  0.134  5 
Overall  75 0.352  0.155   
 
A number of countries have restrictions above average, and only fully liberalised countries 
have completely liberalised exchange controls on services transactions.  A few fundamental 
restrictions remain on the current account and cut across all non-fully liberalised SADC coun- 
tries.  For example, the requirement restricting the repatriation of exports proceeds remains 
over all 10 non-liberalised countries. Authorities have justified the maintenance of this control as 
a method of deterring capital flight and maintaining foreign reserves (Ellyne and Letete, 2012).  
Some of these  countries  justify  the  maintenance of the  surrender requirement on the basis of 
a lack of foreign exchange  liquidity  in the  banks  (Malawi and  Mozambique).  Furthermore, at 
least 4 countries in the SADC still have significant parallel exchange markets operating, which 
indicate some disequilibrium in their official f reign exchange market. 
Figure  2 shows that since 2000, a majority  of SADC  member  states  decreased  their  re- 
strictiveness,   possibly  as  a result  of pressure  from  the  SADC  regional  integration scheme. 
Figure 4 in Appendix A presents the corresponding representation comparing 2005 to 2010. 
Indeed,  the  decline  in average  re trictiveness is far  more  prevalent after  2005, whereas  only 
2 countries  had  reduced  overall controls  between  2000 and  2005 (see Table  8 in the  
Appendix C).  The DRC stands out as having reduced restrictiveness substantially between 
2000 and 2005, compared to the subsequent 5 years. This  trend  reflects  a commitment to  the  
liberalisation effort  that came  about  after  the  publication of a SADC  report  in 2007.   The  
report  calls for SADC  countries  to  relax  exchange  controls  as a step  towards  harmonising 
policies and promoting  economic integration.  It is evident, though, that progress towards 
exchange liberalisation since 2007 has been scattered (Figure 3).   The  more  restrictive 
countries  include the DRC,  Malawi,  Mozambique,  South  Africa  and  Zimbabwe,  who have a 
higher  mean  score of restrictiveness than  the  average level over the  10 years (Figure  3a).27 
The remaining SADC countries fall into the less restrictive category  (Figure  3b). 
Substantial changes  took place in countries  that became  less restrictive over the  10 year 
period,  ranging from  an  approximate 10% decrease  in  South  Africa  to  a  50% decrease  in 
Zimbabwe  (Figure 9 in Appendix  C).  The sharp drop in the ECRI for the Seychelles accurately 
 
26 See Appendix D for various representations of the ECRI values and movement over time for each SADC 
country. 
27 Angola   is  removed   from  this  investigation as  AREAR information is  not  available  for  2007  and  
2009. Angola is found to be one of the most restrictive countries, though, with an exchange control index of 0.56 
in 2010, almost double that of Zimbabwe.  See Appendix D. 
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Figure 2: SADC ECRI for 2000 vs. 2010 
 
Figure 3: Movement in Overall Index across SADC States from 2000-2010 
 
 
 
(a)  More restrictive countries 
(b)  Less restrictive countries 
 
reflects their move to abolish controls on the current and capital accounts in November 2008, 
as part of a broader set of liberalisation measures undertaken in response to deepening 
macroeconomic problems.  Similarly, Zimbabwe stands out markedly for undertaking a major 
liberalisation in 2009.   The index captures Zimbabwe’s highly controlled exchange regime i n  
2005, before its official dollarisation and liberalisation in 2009.  Other  than  Zimbabwe  and 
Seychelles, Mozambique has made substantial initiative  to liberalise recently, and Malawi has 
recently  endeavoured  to  do so by floating  its  currency  in May 2012.28    On   the  other  hand, 
 
28 See Ellyne and Letete (2012) for more detailed information on SADC liberalisation progress based on the ECRI. 
For example, prior to liberalization in 2008, Seychelles had experienced rising debt, fiscal problems, declining 
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Madagascar and Mauritius became slightly more restrictive over the last decade. However, they 
still maintain relatively lower scores and are accurately classified in Figure 3(b) as less 
restrictive. Overall, SADC countries  still need to make substantial effort towards  liberalizing 
exchange controls further  and it is evident that contrary to popular  opinion, exchange 
controls are still relatively binding in the region with member states  facing varying average 
restrictiveness over time (Appendix  D). 
 
5 Empirical Analysis 
 
In  order  to  investigate  the  relationship between  exchange  controls  and  SADC  trade  flows, 
the author estimates  an  augmented version  of the  gravity  model of trade  that incorporates  
insights of Anderson  and  van  Wincoop  (2003)  by  Ordinary Least  Squares  (OLS)  
estimation in the panel setting.  In addition, estimation of the model using Poisson pseudo-
maximum likelihood (PPML), as popularised by Silva and Tenreyro (2006; 2009), is applied to 
check the consistency of the OLS results. 
 
5.1 Empirical Model 
 
Since  its  introduction by  Tinbergen  in  1962,  the  gravity  model  of trade  has  been  widely 
applied  to investigate  the  determinants of patterns of trade  flows between  trading partners. 
It essentially  applies Newton’s gravity theory  to the trade  setting,  where the volume of trade 
between 2 countries  is directly  proportional to the “mass” of each, often captured by a wealth 
or  population variable,   and  inversely  related  to  the  distance  between  the  two.   The most 
common practice in empirical applications has been to log-linearise the original multiplicative 
model in order to perform estimation by OLS. This model has been very successful empirically, 
due to its high explanatory power over various specifications and adaptations i.e. R2 is almost 
a l w a y s  close to or above 60%. 
A  notable   augmentation of the  original  model  was  popularized by  Anderson  and  van 
Wincoop  (2003), who propose that there  exist  underlying  trade  costs between  two countries 
that manifest  in a strong  border  effect or multilateral resistance  that generates  a substantial 
bias when ignored.  Baldwin and Taglioni  (2006) characterise such an omission as the “maxi- 
gold medal  mistake” in panel  gravity  estimation.29 Most  trade  research  bypasses  this  error or 
reduces the corresponding  bias by including fixed effects that capture, for example, separate 
country  (Rose  and  Glick,  2001) and  time  effects,  or  pair  effects (Rose  and  van  Wincoop, 
2001) or corresponding time-varying alternatives (Wei and Zhang, 2007).  The choice of fixed 
effect to control for van Wincoop (2003)’s multilateral resistance terms depends on the topic 
being investigated. For the purposes of this paper, nation and time fixed effects are included as 
this combination has been shown to reduce the bias satisfactorily (Baldwin and Taglioni, 
2006).30 Our model incorporates these findings:  
           
foreign exchange reserves and deteriorating international competitiveness, leading to BOP problems and other 
imbalances. Widespread liberalisation reforms were implemented, including the floating of the exchange rate 
and the removal of exchange controls.  Currency depreciation and a surge in inflation followed the move.  However,  
the situation has now settled with growth, inflation and exchange displaying relative stability and favourable 
rates, and BOP and fiscal deficits have reduced.  Though premature, indications suggest that the economic 
reforms, one of which was exchange control liberalization, generated a foundation for sustainable future 
growth. 
29 “Silver” and “bronze” mistakes constitute the  skewness  caused by aggregating bilateral trade flows and  the  
bias  associated with  using  prices  to  deflate GDP  respectively,  whose  corresponding   biases  can  also  be 
corrected largely by fixed effects estimation (Baldwin and  Taglioni, 2006). 
30 Time-varying fixed  effects  would  wipe  out  the  time-varying  aspect of the  ECRI and  its  sub-indices,  
including country-pair dummies, capture unobservable trade costs that vary  by country pair  which  is unlikely 
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ln(Mijt ) = β0  + β1 ln(Yit ) + β2 ln(Yjt ) + β3 ln(Xit ) + β4 ln(Xjt ) + β5 ln(Dij ) + β6 ln(dij )  
                                           + β7 ECRIit + β8 Tit  + β9 Nit + ln(ηijt ) —  ( 1) 
 
where  Mijt   represent one  way  trade  (annual  imports)   from  countries  j to  countries  i 
(SADC  members)  at  time  t = 1, ..., T  and  ηijt   captures   the  error  term.    GDP  and  GDP 
per capita  of importing  (Yit   and  Xit ) and  exporting  countries  (Yjt   and  X jt ) as well  as the  
distance  between  them  (Dij ) are included  as baseline explanatory variables.   To account for 
historical  and  cultural factors  affecting  SADC  trade,  2 standard dummy  variables  (dij) are 
incorporated  that capture whether  trading partners share a border and common language 
respectively.  As an extension, a SADC RTA dummy variable is included to capture the average 
trade effect of membership to SADC (1 when exporter is a SADC country and   0 otherwise) as 
an extension. In order to account for multilateral resistance, individual importer, exporter and 
time dummies are incorporated as fixed effects (θi , θj  and λt ) respectively).  In addition to the 
baseline variables, the restrictiveness indices are introduced as the trade distortions of interest. 
Firstly, the ECRI and its sub-indices (ECRIit) are introduced separately, along with an index 
measure of tariff restrictiveness (Tit ) a` la Tamarisa (1999).  As per Wei and Zhang (2007), we 
chose a proxy for non-tariff barriers (Nit ) that captures regulatory constraints to importing, 
discussed in the subsequent section. 
Estimating trade relationships such as that specified by (1) using the OLS specification 
exclusively is certainly   in line with extensive trade research. However, recent trade theory 
developments have raised several biases that arise through the least squares approach.   No- 
tably,  estimation by OLS specifies a log-linearised  specification  which i) leads  to  inefficient 
and  inconsistent  results  in the  presence  of heteroskedasticity and  ii) truncates observations 
for which trade is zero by virtue  of the logged dependent variable  (Silva and Tenreyro, 2006; 
2009).31     These issues are evaded by the PPML, which allows for the dependent variable to be 
in levels. This means  that zero trade  is dealt  with  and  consistent  estimates  are  generated 
by the  model regardless  of whether  the  err r  terms  (ηijt ) depend on regressors.   The  latter 
correction  follows, given that the OLS assumption on the independence  of the error variances 
is relaxed  to require  only the  proportionality between  the  mean  and  variance  of the  errors, 
though  the model performs  if this requirement does not hold (Silva and Tenreyro, 2009). 
Apart from the PPML model, a range of alternative approaches have been proposed to deal 
with heteroskedasticity (e.g. Porojan, 2001) and zero values (e.g. Helpman et al, 2008). Each 
has been shown to accompany considerable problems and limitations over various speci- 
fications (Silva and Tenreyro, 2006). For example, this paper inflates zero-trade by ln(1 + Mij) 
in order  to incorporate these  observations, though  this  method  is not  necessarily  supported 
by theory.32    The PPML  stands  out as a tractable way of dealing with both  problems  and is 
thus becoming increasingly  popular  in trade  research.  For the time being, though,  it remains 
a useful  comparative tool to  confirm  OLS  results  rather than  as  a stand-alone estimation 
method  (Silva and  Tenreyro, 2010).  Furthermore, fixed effects can be applied to the PPML 
model with relative ease (Westerlund and Wilhelmsson, 2008). 
The   treatment of zero-trade is especially relevant in the African context, where countries 
 
in  the  case of  SADC  countries, where  unobservable variables are  less likely to vary by trading partners 
compared to  SADC-specific factors  over  time.  Nevertheless,  country-pair effects  are  included as  sensitivity 
checks,  where  results are  broadly consistent with  those  reported in Section 5 and  are  available upon  request. 
31 Jensen’s Inequality informs (i) i . e .  E(ln[Y ])] = ln(E[Y ]),  is overlooked when  log-linearising for  OLS,  a 
process  which  makes the  dependent  variable ln(E[Y]).   The  expected mean of a  random variable is 
inherently dependent  on  its  own  mean  and  higher-order moments of the  distribution  thus the  
homoskedasticity assumption of the  OLS  model  is undermined (Silva  and  Tenreyro, 2003; 2006). 
32 The   HMR  selection model  as  described   in  the  Wei  and  Zhang (2007)   paper   is  likely  to  be  biased by 
incidental  parameter bias  when  the  first  stage probit is performed in a panel environment. 
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are particularly limited in trading partners compared to  global groups.  Zero-trade accounts 
for about a quarter of our dataset.  Recent trade literature presents increasing applications of 
the PPML to the African environment (e.g. Behar and Manners, 2010; Qureshi, 2008; 
Sattayanuwat, 2011). If excluded from the model, as is the case when the dependent variable 
is logged, sample selection bias arises.  As a cautionary note, the PPML assumes both zero and 
non-zero trade are drawn from the same distribution. The PPML version of the model is 
estimated from the multiplicative form and takes the exponential regression functional form: 
 
Mijt  = δ0 Yit δ1 Yjt δ2 Xit δ3 Xjt δ4 Dij δ5 dij δ6 e δ7ECRIit+ δ8Tit + δ9Nit+ εijt  —  ( 2) 
 
where the  model’s explanatory variables  are analogous  to those  in the  OLS specification 
(1) and  importer, exporter  and  time  dummies  are included,  as in t h e  O L S  model.  The 
error term is now captured by εijt . This being said, the focus of this paper is not to investigate 
and compare the econometric soundness of the 2 models as many papers have done (e.g. Martin  
and Pham, 2008; Martinez-Zarzoso et al, 2007) but  rather to use this  discussion to justify  
the  use of the  PPML  model results  as a comparative measure  of the  OLS results, given its 
ability  to deal with potential biases. 
 
5.2 Data 
 
Annual  trade  data  has  been  collected  from  the  IMF  Directions  of Trade  Services  (DOTS) 
for imports  flowing to 11 SADC members from 38 global trading partners from 2000 to 2010 
(including  most  SADC  members).33    The  explanatory dummies  and  the  distances  between 
countries  are  extracted from the  CEPII  database.  Data on GDP and GDP per capita for each 
country are retrieved from the World Bank Development Indicators (WDI). 
The variable of interest is the new SADC ECRI and its sub-indices created for 10 years. 
Measures of tariffs and NTBs are included to provide for comparison purposes a` la Wei and 
Zhang (2007).  Given the difficulty in attaining data on average tariff rates and the complexity 
of SADC tariffs barriers to trade, the tariff and NTB variables included in the model require 
some attention. In both cases we resort to indices of openness as reported in the Economic 
Freedom of the World database (EFW). For the purposes of this paper, the author focuses on a 
mean tariff rate over all applicable import tariffs captured by an index from the EFW ,  which is 
derived directly from individual countries’ WTO Tariff Profiles.34  This sub-component is 
based on the unweighted mean of tariff rates reported in  various issues of the WTO World 
Tariff Profiles. 
The formula allocates a rating of 10 to countries that do not impose tariffs and decline as 
the mean tariff rates approach 50% for most restrictive countries.  Accordingly, as the “mean 
tariff rate” increases, countries are assigned lower ratings.   The   index is constructed via the 
following, where Ωi   represents the country’s mean tariff rate while the values of Ωmin and 
Ωmax are set at 0% and 50% respectively.35: 
 
33 See Appendix E for a list of exporter countries. These include most SADC countries to encapsulate extra- 
and intra-regional dynamics. It must be noted that trade data for SACU countries other than South Africa is 
not included i.e.  Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho and Swaziland and as such are excluded from the ECRI analysis 
above for consistentcy sake.   It is widely acknowledged that SACU trade consists primarily of South African 
trade (Edwards and Behar, 2010: 7) and it is thus reasonable to assume that the SACU trade flows are 
adequately captured by incorporating South African trade data, without reducing the credibility of our results. 
34 This   was  found  to  be  the  most  extensive dataset  of SADC  tariff  rates compared to  other average  
tariff  datasets available such as the WDI. Data from the WITS TRAINS database are too disaggregated for the 
purposes of this paper. 
35 The  selection of 50% as  the  upper  bound of the  tariff  rate is acceptable given  that  only  2 or 3 
countries have  tariff  rates that exceed  this  range. 
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                                                                 Ωmax − Ωi 
Ωmax − Ωmin 
× 10  —  (3)
 
 
A measure of NTBs captures regulatory trade barriers using a measure  of the  compliance  
time  costs  incurred  when  importing  and  exporting  made  available  by  the World  Bank  
report  on Doing Business.36 This  is captured by the  “time  cost of procedures taken  to import  
a full 20 foot container  of dry goods that contains  no hazardous or military items”  measured  
in the  number  of calendar  days  which averages  the  days  taken  to  export a good and  those  
taken  to  import  a good.  It  combines  these  with  survey  results  from  the Global 
Competitiveness Report  that asks whether  tariff and NTBs  are viewed as significant barriers  
to the ability  of imported  goods to compete  in the domestic  market. 
Similar to the tariff index, the NTB index takes 0 to10 ratings, where countries that take 
longer to import and export are given lower ratings. This index is also constructed using equation 
(3), where Ωi now represents the cost value of time measured in days.  Ωmax is set at 
       1.5 standard deviations above the average number   of days and   Ωmin is set at 1.5 standard 
deviations below t h e  average at 62 and 80, and 2 and 0 days respectively.  Ratings of zero or 
10 are assigned to countries that are outside this specified range.  In light of lack of data for 
tariffs and NTBs, these indices are seen as adequately useful, given that they are generated 
from reliable data sources and constructed in a transparent way. 
This paper transforms the index data so that the tariff and NTB indices measure restrictiveness 
rather than openness,  and thus increase with greater restrictiveness, in line with the ECRI.  This 
is done by merely multiplying the  index by -1 so that a higher restrictiveness corresponds  to  
a  less negative  score and  a  lower  restrictiveness generates  a value  closer to  -10. There is a 
certain consistency in the fact that the regression model thereby compares 3 indices that each 
capture the restrictiveness of respective trade distortions i.e. these 2 EFW indices and the ECRI. 
Table 4 presents pairwise correlations between the 2 indices and imports. In accordance with 
expectations, higher mean tariffs and more burdensome time costs of engaging in trade are 
associated with lower imports. It is furthermore useful to note that there is not much correlation 
between the index variables themselves. 
 
Table 4: Cross-correlations of EFW indices and Imports 
 
Variables Imports Tariffs Non-tariff  barriers 
Imports 
Tariffs 
1.000 
-0.149 
 
1.000 
 
Non-Tariff Barriers -0.191 0.310 1.000 
Note:  EFW indices have been adapted so that each index increases 
with increasing restrictiveness. 
 
 
 
5.3 Results 
 
In this  section,  the  effect of the  ECRI  and  its sub-indices  on SADC imports  is tested  using 
the  OLS and  PPML  models.   All the output, barring t he benchmark model, is included in 
Appendix F. 
 
36 For   this   database see http://www.doingbusiness.org/ and the database used to create the tariff index is 
http://www.weforum.org/en/initiatives/gcp/index.html. 
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5.3.1 Benchmark Model 
 
Table 5 shows that the results presented by this paper are generally consistent for the benchmark 
model, whether estimating the gravity model by OLS or PPML. Whether NTBs are included 
([3] and [4]) or not ([1]  and  [2]),  the  baseline  variables  are highly significant and  generally  
accord  quite  closely with a priori expectations that the income elasticity  of trade  is close to 
unitary elastic in the case of importer  (SADC member)  GDP  (ranging  between 0.9 and 1) 
and, likewise, that a 1% increase  in the  distance  between  trading partners reduces  trade  by 
around  1%.  The results differ when the effect of exporter GDP is considered, where in the 
PPML case the effect of the exporter’s GDP is bigger than expected with an estimate higher than 
1.5% though OLS boasts an estimate close to that on importer GDP. This is a possible cause 
for concern and further analysis of the data should be conducted to illuminate the reasons for this 
singular divergence.  
Nevertheless, the  inflated  effect is persistently significant across all models (Tables  5-14) 
and represents  the  only  major  deviation  between  the  2 estimation techniques  and  suggests  
an interesting dynamic  that is indicative of the  specific trade  relationship of this  paper.   The 
exaggerated effect of the  partner country  GDP  on SADC imports can be justified  when 
considering the distortionary effect of smaller exporting  countries  in the total  concentration of 
imports  to the trade  bloc.  This estimate could be capturing the effect of increasing import 
dependence of SADC countries on each other, specifically on South Africa (see Section 2.2).  
Compared to other partner countries, like China, these countries have not boasted large changes 
in GDP over the last 10 years and are comparatively smaller than o t h e r  exporting pa r tne r s , 
which would magnify t h e  effect of small changes in their GDP on average imports over the 
years.   
Sharing a border and official language represent significant drivers of increases in average 
SADC trade growth between 2000 and 2010, with reasonable magnitudes over both   models.  
For the OLS model (1), ceteris   paribus, contiguity has increased trade by 0.86% (e618 -1) over 
the decade. Sharing an official language corresponds to a 0.5% (e0.418 -1) increase in imports.  
The estimate on the common language is higher for PPML, which is not unreasonable. Sharing 
a border has a prominent effect, especially considering the increased dependence on other 
SADC members, specifically for imports over the past decade.  OLS estimates  on the dummy 
capturing shared language  is logical given that a common  language  is likely less important 
to SADC imports as trade  patterns are  globally dominated by BRIC  and  EU countries  
that do not  generally have the same official language.  Indeed, discrepancies between the 
models are expected, given the corrections afforded by PPML estimation. 
With  regard  to  the  variables  of interest, there  is significant evidence  to  suggest  that, 
keeping  all else constant, overall  SADC  exchange  controls as measured  by  the  ECRI  have 
acted  as non-tariff  barriers  over the  10 year  period  from 2000, with  a constricting effect on 
average  SADC  imports  over  this  10 year  period.  The  gravitas  of this  result  is supported 
by the  fact that the  magnitude and  direction  of the  effect is consistent and  almost  identical 
across  OLS and  PPML. The measurement of the actual effect is not straightforward, and, indeed, 
a drawback of using indices as regressors is the difficulty associated with interpreting their 
coefficients.   
An examination of the change in restrictiveness from the 25th and 75th percentiles of the 
index can give us an idea of the magnitude of the effect on average imports, though, this is an 
imperfect calculation. We demonstrate this for the OLS case (1),  which excludes the NTB 
index.  On average, an increase in exchange control  restrictiveness from 25 (given by the 
Seychelles in 2001) to  44 (given  by  Malawi  in  2010) has  lead  to a 14.13% (e[19×−0.00802] -1  
x 100)  decrease in imports  to the SADC. When  the  NTB  index is included  (3) this  result  
increases marginally  i.e. when the  restrictiveness of exchange  control  index  increases  from 
25th  percentile  (given by the Seychelles in 2001) to the 75th  percentile  (given by Malawi in 
2010), average SADC imports is reduced by 19.09% (e[19×−0.00101] -1 x 100). As mentioned, the 
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size effects on average trade generated by the PPML model  barely differ from those of the 
OLS model and, as such, the quantified result will be similar. 
The other trade distortions included are the indices capturing the restrictiveness of tariffs 
and time cost regulatory tariff barriers.  While the persistent significant estimate of the former 
over both OLS and   PPML   models (indeed, this is the case for all specifications from Table 5-
Table 14), there is weak evidence to support a similar consistent effect of regulatory trade 
barriers on average imports over the specified period.  Higher time costs of importing present a 
significant deterrent to trade in the OLS model, even more than that of tariffs, which is not 
unlikely (Portugal-Perez and Wilson, 2008).  However, the PPML model reports that there is no 
evidence to support t his relationship.  Consequently, we are inclined to question the significance 
of this determinant of SADC imports.   
This is not unexpected considering the relatively widespread  insignificance of similar NTB 
indices investigated in aggregate  preliminary models for the SADC by Edwards  and Behar 
(2011) and the fact that other  NTBs such as infrastructural weakness are more relevant to the 
African case (Portugal-Perez and Wilson, 2008). Indeed, the variable also only captures a small 
aspect of the possible NTBs prevalent in the region.  Nevertheless, Table 5 shows that the other 
estimates are practically analogous when the NTB index is included or not, and so we find it 
appropriate to incorporate the variable in the following regressions for the sake of  
consistency. It is the author’s conclusion that more research needs to be conducted on other 
existing indices that capture the NTB effect.  
 
5.3.2 Further Empirical Results 
 
The additional models run are included in Appendix E. When  disaggregating the ECRI  into 
its 5 sub-indices over models (1) to (5) in Table 9 and 10, the OLS and PPML  estimations both  
report the  significance  of foreign  exchange  transactions relating  to  services  (3)  as  a 
restriction on  imports  with  a  bigger  constraining effect in  PPML  estimation (-0.00734  as 
opposed  to  -0.00424 in  Table  9) an  increase  in  restrictiveness of service  transactions  from 
11.11 (corresponds  to Madagascar in 2005) to 57.5% (corresponding to Malawi in 2005).  In 
addition, restrictions on exchange  related  to goods becomes significant in the  PPML  model 
whereas  the  OLS  model  reports  the  restrictions applying  to  all  exchange  transactions to 
be significant  barriers  to  average  SADC  imports  over the  period.   This result is indicative 
of the interplay of the sub-indices between goods, services and restrictions.  The former 2 
categories are specific to trade payments, and the latter involves exchange rate considerations 
(see Appendix B). 
Indeed, Table 7 in Appendix C shows the exceptionally high pairwise correlations between 
the variables, especially goods and services. The  implications  of this  is that the  disaggrega- 
tion  of the  indices into  5 categories  (as  opposed  to  just  3 a`  la Wei and  Zhang,  2007) may 
be an overkill when estimating their  individual effects, which end up covering an undesirably 
small number of exchange restrictions per category (see Table  3).  It may be appropriate to lump 
services and goods together under current account restrictions as past literature has done.  As 
such we find it satisfactory to interpret the significance of either goods or services restrictions 
or both as indicative of the overall current account control effect.  Indeed, this current account 
restrictiveness effect seems to present a significant barrier   to imports over the 2000-2010 
period. The significance of the  restrictions applying  to all categories,  (5) in Table 9, is in line 
with  Wei and  Zhang  (2007), and  also likely captures  the  overlapping  effects of the  other  
categories.  Overall, the transaction costs generated by restrictions on the current account 
seem to dominate the ECRI effect on trade. 
Contrastingly, there is no evidence to suggest tha t  controls o n  the capital account or 
financial sector have had a significant effect on average trade flows to the region over the last 
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Table 5: ECRI across Both Models 
 
 (1) 
OLS 
(2) 
PPML 
(3) 
OLS 
(4) 
PPML 
Log GDP  SADC 0.900*** 
(0.154) 
1.000*** 
(0.156) 
0.939*** 
(0.176) 
0.975*** 
(0.165) 
Log GDP  exporter  0.902*** 2.043*** 0.986*** 2.051*** 
 (0.288) (0.205) (0.327) (0.210) 
Log distance -0.836*** 
(0.182) 
-0.993*** 
(0.259) 
-0.871*** 
(0.193) 
-0.970*** 
(0.274) 
Common  border 0.618*** 
(0.139) 
0.763*** 
(0.229) 
0.644*** 
(0.149) 
0.795*** 
(0.239) 
Common  language 0.418*** 
(0.0736) 
0.739*** 
(0.135) 
0.428*** 
(0.0782) 
0.724*** 
(0.138) 
Tariff index -0.0699*** 
(0.0190) 
-0.129*** 
(0.0236) 
-0.0488*** 
(0.0179) 
-0.123*** 
(0.0277) 
NTB index   -0.0830*** 
(0.0277) 
-0.0343 
(0.0336) 
ECRI  -0.00802*** -0.0164*** -0.0101*** -0.0168*** 
(0.00303)  (0.00482)    (0.00291)    (0.00469) 
 
Observations 3434 3434 3144 3144 
Adjusted R2  0.592 0.952 0.594 0.955 
 
The  dependent variable takes  the  form  of log (1 + imports) in models  (1) and 
(3)  and  level  imports for  (2)  and  (4).   Robust standard-errors in parentheses 
are clustered by importer over time. Importer, exporter and year fixed effects 
are applied. * p < 0.10,  ** p < 0.05,  *** p < 0.01 
 
 
10 years similar to the results of Wei and Zhang (2007).  The  robustness  of this  result  over 
both  PPML  models is verified by the  insignificance of the  comparable  Chinn-Ito (CI)  index 
that measures financial liberalisation (as discussed in Section 3.1 and 4.1) in Table 8. As a side 
note, the direction of the CI index displays a constricting effect on trade only in (4) estimated 
by the PPML model.37   Overall, all ECRI sub-indices have the same directional (reducing) effect 
on trade. 
As an  extension, a SADC  RTA  dummy  (equal  to  1 when  exporter  is also a member  of 
the SADC) is included in the benchmark models in Table  12 and  their  corresponding coefficient 
estimates  demonstrate that there  is no evidence  to  support  the  claim  that average  SADC 
imports  have been significantly  improved by membership  of the preferential  (now free) trade 
area between 2000 and 2010.38   This is in accordance  with results  discussed in Section 2.2. 
Furthermore, as a preliminary extension   to the benchmark models presented, we include 
 
37 The   abovementioned notion, that the indices presented are  too  disaggregated and may  not afford  very  
useful  coefficient  estimates, does  not  apply to  this  result on  capital. If we had undertaken less 
disaggregation, the categories would have captured capital account related transactions as a sub-index and, as 
such, this result is useful and reliable. 
38 As a  stylistic note, the variable label “SADC RTA” as opposed to “SADC FTA” is more appropriate, given 
t h a t  the FTA was only established in 2008. 
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corruption indicators   as  measures of corruption,  reported   by  the  Global  Competitiveness 
Report,  to account for some institutional effect of SADC countries  for interest  sake.  As such, 
Table  13 and  Table  14 include  the  ECRI  and  a few of its  sub-indices  (goods,  services and 
applying  to all) respectively, in addition  capturing governance  and interaction terms  between 
ECRIs  and the corruption variable.  Ellyne and Letete  (2012) note that some large prominent 
private sector businesses in the SADC expressed serious concerns about  the level of corruption 
in the region as a sizeable hindrance to do business in such places.  Such factors are expected 
to dwarf the impact of exchange controls on trade.  
Indeed, most exchange controls become insignificant in the presence of the institutional 
index.  Restrictions on services stand out as a highly significant barrier to trade, even in the 
presence of governance variables, though the magnitude of the effect is unchanged without this 
variable.  Corruption levels are likely to affect the prevalence of exchange controls and, indeed, 
the correlations between this index and various institutional indices are high (Chater, 2012). 
Interestingly, models (1), (2) and (7) demonstrate that the estimates  on tariff and non- tariff 
barrier  restrictiveness indices become closer in their effect on trade  when the corruption index  
is included,  decreasing  the  relative  significance of the  non-tariff  index.   This  suggests that 
the costs of engaging in trade  may capture an element of governance quality, which makes its 
inhibiting effect on trade  larger when the corruption variable  is excluded  (Table 10).  The 
corruption variable is generally a  negative barrier to trade, significant in PPML models (3) and 
(8).   These results shou ld  not be given undue importance though, but should rather be 
treated as an exploratory model to demonstrate the importance of considering institutional 
factors to inform the conclusions of the baseline results. 
 
5.3.3 Caveats to Results 
 
Though the results presented are interesting, we must examine the points of weakness on which 
future research can focus.   Endogeneity is a persistent cause  for concern  in this  regression 
model  as  countries  that have  more  restrictive exchange  control  policies may  tend  to  have 
lower trade  (Tamarisa, 1999; Wei and  Zhang,  2007). An example of this is the link between 
exchange controls and an overvalued exchange rate which could itself play a part in reducing trade. 
In order to incorporate this consideration in future explorations of the model, a continuous exchange 
rate variable could be included in the regression. Furthermore, the specifications do not account 
for a number of factors that are indicative of the SADC experience, especially given the lack of 
evidence supporting the regulatory trade barrier index as a viable proxy for NTBs in the region.  
Ideally, the relationship should be tested over other datasets, with aggregated tariff data.  The 
database is also rather small, and although zero trade is included to reduce the corresponding 
sample selection bias, this bias associated with the small sample size may still lead to 
inconsistent results. 
The  fact that the  de jure  measures  do not  take  into  account the  actual  enforcement of 
controls could explain the general insignificance of sub-indices as barriers  to trade. Making use 
of the de jure measures does not consider whether the controls are actually binding or not which is 
indicative of the index coding method, as discussed in Section 4.2. Indeed the 2012 Study on 
SADC Exchange Control Liberalisation revealed that private sector members did not identify 
exchange controls on merchandise flows as a concern when outlining perceived impediments to 
the promotion of a successful SADC FTA (Ellyne and Letete, 2012). This is likely due to the 
fact that these controls are not properly enforced by governing bodies. The effect of inept 
institutions that reduce the effective enforcement of these controls would be captured by an 
alternative de facto measure.  A final consideration concerns the fact that the sub-indices capture 
less information than that of the overall index and may not vary enough over the years to 
generate reliable results as individual regressors in the panel model.   These  concerns  should  be  
taken  into  account,  though  the results can still be interpreted with confidence especially 
given their  robustness  over the OLS and PPML  models. 
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6 Discussion 
 
The paper’s conclusions are two-fold.  Firstly, it is evident that exchange controls persist in the 
SADC. Secondly, these restrictions to transactions related to foreign exchange have acted as a 
significant barrier to member countries’ average imports between 2000 and 2010, a result that 
corroborates research by Tamarisa (1999) and Wei and  Zhang  (2007).  The effect is driven 
particularly by the current account, which faces persistent restrictions, though their prevalence 
varies considerably across member states.  In this way, exchange controls seem to be acting as 
non-tariff barriers, inhibiting trade to the region from SADC and non-SADC trading partners, 
by increasing the costs of engaging in foreign exchange transactions and related to trade 
activities. Capital constraints have not presented noticeable restrictions on trade, though their 
effect is likely too indirect to capture in the restrictiveness component alone. 
Overall,  these  results  are  consistent over  both  the  OLS  and  PPML  estimations of the 
augmented gravity model, except  for the insignificance of the chosen non-tariff  barrier  (NTB) 
index in the latter case.  This suggests that the time costs involved with importing do not act 
as significant barriers to trade in the SADC case. Otherwise, only slight discrepancies are evident 
between the 2 models, which gives considerable weight to the results. The implication  is that 
moving forward  to the  goal of currency  regionalism  in the SADC, the  corresponding  
harmonisation and relaxation of the  controls  on foreign exchange  transactions will likely 
have  an  encouraging effect on trade,  specifically imports,  to the region. 
In this way, the liberalisation of these controls should reduce constraints to the implemen- 
tation of the established FTA between SADC countries.  As such, exchange  controls  should not  
be excluded  from  the  list  of empirically  tested  NTBs  in the  region, as has  hitherto been 
the  case. Though these  results  are informative,  it is not  easy to isolate  the  impact  of exchange 
controls  on trade  when other  non-economic  factors  such as political  instability and 
regulatory quality  are distorting the  relationship (Ellyne  and  Letete,  2012).  To this end, it 
is recommended that  further research should test the robustness of the SADC trade effect of 
exchange control restrictiveness when relevant institutional factors are taken into account. 
With regard to the construction of the exchange control restrictiveness index (ECRI), the 
paper provides an accessible and transparent measure the restrictiveness of exchange controls 
that is consistent across SADC member states.  As such, it  provides  a useful tool in 
furthering research  related  to  the  dynamics  of exchange  controls  with  other  economic  
factors  for example  the  effect of the  ECRI  on FDI flows specific to the SADC region.  Such 
research can inform the feasibility and consequences of the move to establish a regional 
monetary union in 2018, which constitutes an important part of the continent-wide 
integration goals. 
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A  Index Construction 
 
 
Table 6: Number of Restrictions 
 
0 No restrictions Totally liberalised/open 
 
2 Low restrictiveness Reporting required or issue of timing 
Permission or high level of 
4 Medium restrictiveness reporting required, significant 
timing restriction, license  
 
6 High restrictiveness Quantity restriction, but limits may not be very binding 
 
8 Maximum restrictiveness Binding quantity restriction or total p rohib i t ion  
 
Note:  A higher value captures increasing exchange control restrictiveness. 
 
The index indicates the percentage of total possible restrictiveness that a country’s de jure 
policies suggests.   In principle, scores may range from 0 to 100.  The  sub-index  percentages 
are  calculated  by  dividing  the  sum  of the  scores assigned  to  each  individual  restriction in 
the category  by the total possible sum that could have been awarded  (number  of restrictions 
multiplied  by 8): 
 
Sub-index  = 
 
sum of   field scores 
8 × number of    fields  
 
× 100 
 
The overall index score for a country is then calculated as the aggregation of the sub-indices: 
 
               sum of all scores 
ECRI  = 
8 × number  of  all  field  categories 
× 100 
 
For all scores, the index indicates the percentage of total possible restrictiveness that a country 
policy suggests. 
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B  Examples of AREAR Line Items 
 
 
                 
Figure 4: Goods, Services and Financial ECRI AREAR Line Items 
 
Goods ECRI Services ECRI Financial Sector ECRI 
 
VII. Imports and Import Payments 
IX. Payments for Invisible Transactions 
and Current Transfers 
 
A. Foreign exchange budget A. Controls on these transfers 
 
XII. Provisions Specific to the Financial 
Sector 
A. Provisions specific to commercial banks 
and other credit institutions 
B. Financing requirements for imports 1. Trade-related service payments 1. Borrowing abroad 
1. Minimum financing requirements a. Prior approval 2. Maintenance of accounts abroad 
3. Lending to nonresidents (financial or 
2. Advance payment requirements b. Quantitative limits commercial credits) 
3. Advance import deposits c. Indicative limits/bona fide test 4. Lending locally in foreign exchange 
C. Documentation requirements for release 
of   foreign exchange for imports 2. Investment-related payments 
 
1. Domiciliation requirements a. Prior approval 
5. Purchase of  locally issued 
securities denominated in foreign 
exchange 
6. Differential treatment of deposit accounts 
in foreign exchange 
2. Preshipment inspection b. Quantitative limits a. Reserve requirements 
3. Letters of credit c. Indicative limits/bona fide test b. Liquid asset requirements 
4. Import licenses used as exchange 
licenses 3. Payments for travel c. Interest rate controls 
5. Other a. Prior approval d. Credit controls 
D. Import licenses and other nontariff 
measures b. Quantitative limits 
7. Differential treatment of deposit accounts 
held by nonresidents 
1. Positive list c. Indicative limits/bona fide test a. Reserve requirements 
2. Negative list 4. Personal payments b. Liquid asset requirements 
3. Open general licenses a. Prior approval c. Interest rate controls 
4. Licenses with quotas b. Quantitative limits d. Credit controls 
5. Other nontariff measures c. Indicative limits/bona fide test 8. Investment regulations 
E. Import taxes and/or tariffs 5. Foreign workers' wages a. Abroad by banks 
1. Taxes collected through the exchange 
system a. Prior approval b. In banks by nonresidents 
F. State import monopoly b. Quantitative limits 9. Open foreign exchange position limits 
G. References to legal instruments and 
hyperlinks c. Indicative limits/bona fide test a. On resident assets and liabilities 
6. Credit card use abroad b. On nonresident assets and liabilities 
B. Provisions specific to institutional 
VIII.  Exports and Export Proceeds 
a. Prior approval investors 
A. Repatriation requirements b. Quantitative limits 1. Insurance companies 
a. Limits (max.) on securities issued by 
1. Surrender requirements c. Indicative limits/bona fide test 
a. Surrender to the central bank 7. Other payments 
b. Surrender to authorized dealers a. Prior approval 
 
B. Financing requirements b. Quantitative limits 
nonresidents 
b. Limits (max.) on investment portfolio held 
abroad 
c. Limits (min.) on investment portfolio held 
locally 
d. Currency-matching regulations on 
assets/liabilities composition 
C. Documentation requirements c.! Indicative limits/bona fide test 2. Pension funds 
 
1. Letters of  credit 
 
2. Guarantees 
B. References to legal instruments and 
hyperlinks 
 
 
X. Proceeds from Invisible Transactions 
a. Limits (max.) on securities issued by 
nonresidents 
b. Limits (max.) on investment portfolio 
held abroad 
 
3. Domiciliation and Current Transfers 
c.  Limits (min.) on investment portfolio 
held locally 
d. Currency-matching regulations on 
4. Preshipment inspection A. Repatriation requirements 
 
5. Other 1. Surrender requirements 
D. Export licenses a. Surrender to the central bank 
1. Without quotas b. Surrender to authorized dealers 
2. With quotas B. Restrictions on use of funds 
C. References to legal instruments and 
assets/liabilities composition 
3. Investment firms and collective investment 
funds 
E. Export taxes 
1. Collected through the exchange system 
2. Other export taxes 
F. References to legal instruments and 
hyperlinks 
hyperlinks 
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Figure 5: AREAR Line Items for ECRI on Capital Account and Applying to all AREAR Line Items 
 
                                    Capital ECRI                                        ECRI applying to all 
 
                             XI. Capital Transactions                      III. Exchange Arrangement 
 
  A. Controls on capital transactions A. Currency 
  1. Repatriation requirements 1. Other legal tender 
  a. Surrender requirements B. Exchange rate structure 
  1. Surrender to the central bank 1. Unitary 
  2. Surrender to authorized dealers 2. Dual 
  2. Controls on capital & money market instruments  3.Multiple 
  a. On capital market securities C. Classification 
  1. Shares or other securities of a participating nature 1.No separate legal tender  
  i. Purchase locally by nonresidents 2. Currency board 
ii. Sale or issue locally by nonresidents 3. Conventional peg 
iii. Purchase abroad by residents 4. Stabilized arrangement  
iv. Sale or issue abroad by residents 5. Crawling peg 
2. Bonds or other debt securities 6.Crawl-like arrangement 
i. Purchase locally by nonresidents 7. Pegged exchange rate within horizontal bands 
ii. Sale or issue locally by nonresidents 8.Other managed arrangement 
iii. Purchase abroad by residents 9.Floating 
iv. Sale or issue abroad by residents 10.Free floating b. 
On money market instruments D. Exchange tax 
1. Purchase locally by nonresidents E. Exchange subsidy 
2. Sale or issue locally by nonresidents F. Foreign exchange market 
3. Purchase abroad by residents 1. Spot exchange market 
4. Sale or issue abroad by residents a. Operated by the central bank 
c. On collective investment securities 1. Allocation 
1. Purchase locally by nonresidents 2.Auction 
2. Sale or issue locally by nonresidents 3. Fixing 
3. Purchase abroad by residents b. Interbank market 
4. Sale or issue abroad by residents 2. Forward exchange market 
3. Controls on derivatives and other instruments a. Official cover of forward operations 
a. Purchase locally by nonresidents I. References to legal instruments and hyperlinks 
b. Sale or issue locally by nonresidents 
c. Purchase abroad by residents       IV. Arrangements for Payments and Receipts 
d. Sale or issue abroad by residents A. Prescription of currency requirements 
4. Controls on credit operations 1. Controls on the use of domestic currency 
a. Commercial credits a. For current transactions and payments 
1. By residents to nonresidents b. For capital transactions 
2. To residents from nonresidents 1.Transactions in capital and money market instruments 
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Figure 6: AREAR Line Items for Capital ECRI and ECRI Applying to all continued... 
 
b. Financial credits 2.Transactions in derivatives and other instruments 
1. By residents to nonresidents 3. Credit operations 
2. To residents from nonresidents 2. Controls on Use of foreign exchange among residents 
c. Guarantees, sureties, and financial backup facilities B. Payments arrangements 
1. By residents to nonresidents 1. Bilateral payments arrangements 
2. To residents from nonresidents a. Operative 
5. Controls on direct investment b. Inoperative 
a. Outward direct investment 2. Regional arrangements 
b. Inward direct investment 3. Clearing agreements 
6. Controls on liquidation of direct investment 4. Barter agreements and open accounts 
7. Controls on real estate transactions C. Administration of control 
a. Purchase abroad by residents D. Payments arrears 
b. Purchase locally by nonresidents 1.Official 
c. Sale locally by nonresidents 2.Private 
8. Controls on personal capital transactions E. Controls on trade in gold (coins and/or bullion) 
a. Loans 1.On domestic ownership and/or trade 
1. By residents to nonresidents 2.On external trade 
2. To residents from nonresidents F. Controls on exports and imports of banknotes 
b. Gifts, endowments, inheritances, and legacies 1. On exports 
1. By residents to nonresidents a. Domestic currency 
2. To residents from nonresidents b. Foreign currency 
c. Settlement of debts abroad by immigrants 2. On imports 
d. Transfer of assets a. Domestic currency 
1. Transfer abroad by emigrants b. Foreign currency 
2. Transfer into the country by immigrants G. References to legal instruments and hyperlinks 
e. Transfer of gambling and prize earnings 
B. References to legal instruments and hyperlinks                                   V. Resident Accounts 
A. Foreign exchange accounts permitted 
1. Held domestically 
a. Approval required 
2. Held abroad 
a. Approval required 
B. Accounts in domestic currency held abroad 
 
C. Accounts in domestic currency convertible into foreign 
currency 
D. References to legal instruments and hyperlinks 
 
VI. Nonresident Accounts 
A. Foreign exchange accounts permitted 
1. Approval required 
B. Domestic currency accounts 
1. Convertible into foreign currency 
2. Approval required 
C. Blocked accounts 
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s 
 
 
1.000    
0.870 1.000   
0.937 0.835 1.000  
0.863 0.646 0.712 1.000 
0.888 0.793 0.866 0.726 
0.903 0.741 0.791 0.727 
 
 
 Services Capital  
Account  
ncial   
tor to all  
 
 
 69,4 61,4  ,7 57,7   
 27,5 48,2  ,7 26,9   
 11,1 44,6  ,0 35,0   
 60,0 53,6  ,7 38,0   
 0,0 33,9  ,8 10,0   
 50,0 46,4  ,2 34,3   
 0,0 7,1  ,5 11,1   
 55,0 55,4  ,1 20,2   
 17,5 53,6  ,5 31,7   
 0,0 3,6  3 13,0   
 10,0 57,1  ,1 27,9   
 
 
 
 
C  Index Analysis 
 
 
 
Figure 7: SADC Overall Exchange Control Indices for 2005 vs. 2010 
 
 
 
 
Control Index 
 
Overall 
Goods 
Services 
Capital 
Financial account 
Table 7: Cross-correlations of indices   
Financial 
account 
 
 
 
 
 
1.000 
 
 
Applying 
to all 
Applying to all 0.675 1.000 
 
 
 
 
 
Country 
 
Angola DRC 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Mauritius 
Mozambique 
Seychelles 
South Africa 
Tanzania 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
Figure 8: Disaggregated SADC ECRIs for 2010 
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Table 8: Changes in ECRI over time 
 
2000 - 2005 
− + 
2005 - 2010 
− + 
2000 - 2010 
− + 
Angola  Madagascar 
DRC  Malawi 
South  Africa  Mozambique 
Mauritius 
Mozambique 
Seychelles 
Tanzania 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
Angola   DRC 
Malawi  Madagascar 
Mozambique    Mauritius 
Seychelles Tanzania 
South  Africa   Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
Angola  Madagascar 
DRC  Mauritius 
Malawi  Mozambique 
Seychelles Tanzania 
South  Africa   Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
 
 
Figure 9: SADC ECRIs from 2000 to 2010 
 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Angola 58,1 62,7 61,5 60,9 59,6 57,8 59,0 … 58,3 … 56,0 
DRC 41,3 39,0 39,2 37,1 34,6 34,6 34,3 34,4 35,8 36,8 35,7 
Madagascar 28,0 29,0 29,4 29,0 28,9 29,4 27,7 25,9 28,8 30,4 31,9 
Malawi 45,2 47,5 46,2 45,8 45,8 46,3 45,9 43,3 45,3 44,9 44,9 
Mauritius 13,5 16,0 16,0 14,6 14,6 15,8 15,8 15,1 15,1 18,2 16,8 
Mozambique 38,8 40,2 40,7 40,7 40,7 43,4 44,7 44,9 41,9 42,3 41,7 
Seychelles 22,2 25,8 25,8 25,8 33,5 30,9 25,4 25,4 15,3 9,7 9,7 
South Africa 44,0 43,5 39,9 43,8 41,7 42,1 41,4 43,8 43,2 41,9 39,9 
Tanzania 32,1 32,1 33,2 33,7 33,7 35,2 34,4 35,3 35,3 37,3 36,1 
Zambia 8,6 7,1 7,4 7,0 7,4 9,1 8,7 9,3 10,6 9,7 9,3 
Zimbabwe 56,3 59,6 60,4 61,8 62,9 61,4 63,0 62,7 51,7 50,3 29,7 
 
 
D  Disaggregated ECRI summary statistics 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Angola ECRI Summary Statistics 
 
  Goods Services Capital Financial    Applies 
Account Sector to all 
 
Overall 
Mean 50,3 66,0 67,9 61,3 56,4 59,3 
Median 50,0 65,0 70,5 61,1 56,5 59,0 
Std. Dev. 2,6 1,9 4,8 13,2 1,8 2,1 
Min 47,9 63,9 58,3 41,7 53,9 56,0 
Max 54,5 69,4 72,7 78,1 59,6 62,7 
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Figure 11: DRC ECRI Summary Statistics 
 
  Goods Services Capital Financial    Applies 
Account Sector to all 
 
Overall 
Mean 41,1 35,9 44,7 43,0 27,3 36,6 
Median 37,5 30,0 51,8 41,7 26,9 35,8 
Std. Dev. 7,2 9,8 11,3 3,4 5,8 2,3 
Min 35,4 27,5 29,2 39,6 20,8 34,3 
Max 54,5 50,0 54,2 50,0 38,2 41,3 
 
 
Figure 12: Madagascar ECRI Summary Statistics 
 
  Goods Services Capital Financial    Applies 
Account Sector to all 
 
Overall 
Mean 21,4 11,1 46,8 17,6 34,0 28,9 
Median 20,8 11,1 50,0 16,7 35,0 29,0 
Std. Dev. 1,9 0,0 4,9 19,6 3,9 1,5 
Min 20,8 11,1 38,9 0,0 26,3 25,9 
Max 27,1 11,1 53,6 45,0 38,1 31,9 
 
 
Figure 13: Malawi ECRI Summary Statistics 
 
  Goods Services Capital Financial    Applies 
Account Sector to all 
 
Overall 
Mean 40,0 59,7 47,8 45,8 41,2 45,6 
Median 39,6 60,0 45,8 50,0 41,3 45,8 
Std. Dev. 2,0 3,6 4,1 5,9 2,7 1,1 
Min 37,5 55,0 43,8 37,5 35,5 43,3 
Max 43,8 68,8 53,6 50,0 44,8 47,5 
 
 
 
Figure 14: Mauritius ECRI Summary Statistics 
 
  Goods Services Capital Financial    Applies 
Account Sector to all 
 
Overall 
Mean 25,9 0,0 19,3 14,5 15,8 15,6 
Median 25,0 0,0 16,7 15,0 16,3 15,8 
Std. Dev. 3,9 0,0 7,0 3,4 2,6 1,3 
Min 22,7 0,0 12,5 10,4 10,0 13,5 
Max 31,8 0,0 33,9 18,8 18,5 18,2 
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Figure 15: Mozambique ECRI Summary Statistics 
 
  Goods Services Capital Financial    Applies 
Account Sector to all 
 
Overall 
Mean 30,5 58,4 50,6 48,5 33,0 41,8 
Median 29,2 55,0 54,2 47,2 33,0 41,7 
Std. Dev. 2,8 9,3 4,0 3,4 4,3 1,9 
Min 27,1 50,0 46,4 45,8 23,8 38,8 
Max 35,4 72,5 54,2 55,0 38,9 44,9 
 
 
 
Figure 16: Seychelles ECRI Summary Statistics 
 
  Goods Services Capital Financial    Applies 
Account Sector to all 
 
Overall 
Mean 28,4 18,6 17,1 15,0 27,6 22,7 
Median 33,3 25,0 16,7 15,0 31,8 25,4 
Std. Dev. 9,2 12,2 14,4 2,0 8,6 7,9 
Min 14,6 0,0 5,4 12,5 11,1 9,7 
Max 39,6 32,5 58,3 18,8 37,5 33,5 
 
 
 
Figure 17: South Africa ECRI Summary Statistics 
 
  Goods Services Capital Financial    Applies 
Account Sector to all 
 
Overall 
Mean 41,1 53,9 52,2 52,6 27,8 42,3 
Median 39,6 52,5 50,0 52,1 28,1 42,1 
Std. Dev. 1,9 4,9 3,0 2,8 4,7 1,5 
Min 39,6 47,5 47,9 47,9 20,2 39,9 
Max 43,8 62,5 55,4 57,5 34,8 44,0 
 
 
 
Figure 18: Tanzania ECRI Summary Statistics 
 
  Goods Services Capital Financial    Applies 
Account Sector to all 
 
Overall 
Mean 32,8 24,5 52,7 33,6 30,3 34,4 
Median 32,5 25,0 53,6 35,0 29,3 34,4 
Std. Dev. 2,4 3,7 5,2 10,1 1,3 1,6 
Min 29,5 17,5 39,3 20,5 29,0 32,1 
Max 35,0 27,5 56,3 52,3 32,3 37,3 
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Figure 19: Zambia ECRI Summary Statistics 
 
  Goods Services Capital Financial    Applies 
Account Sector to all 
 
Overall 
Mean 15,7 0,0 3,9 9,8 10,5 8,6 
Median 14,6 0,0 4,2 8,3 12,0 8,7 
Std. Dev. 1,4 0,0 0,3 3,0 2,9 1,2 
Min 14,6 0,0 3,6 8,3 6,8 7,0 
Max 18,8 0,0 4,2 18,2 13,5 10,6 
 
 
 
Figure 20: Zimbabwe ECRI Summary Statistics 
 
  Goods Services Capital Financial    Applies 
Account Sector to all 
 
Overall 
Mean 46,0 72,5 58,5 61,9 50,5 56,3 
Median 52,1 85,0 57,1 63,9 53,7 60,4 
Std. Dev. 11,0 24,4 3,4 13,0 9,2 9,9 
Min 20,8 10,0 56,3 27,1 27,9 29,7 
Max 52,1 90,0 64,3 70,8 58,3 63,0 
 
 
 
E  Data 
 
 
 
Figure 21: List of Exporters 
 
Argentina Hong Kong Malaysia Switzerland 
Australia India Mauritius Singapore 
Brazil Indonesia Mexico South Africa 
China Israel Mozambique Sweden 
Cote d'Ivoire Italy Nigeria Tanzania 
DRC Japan Norway Thailand 
Finland Kenya Philippines United Kingdom 
France Madagascar Russia United States 
Germany Malawi Seychelles Zambia 
   Zimbabwe 
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F Further Empirical Results 
 
 
 
Table 9: Disaggregated Indices using OLS 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
 
Log GDP SADC  0.901*** 1.011*** 0.832*** 0.864*** 0.819*** 
(0.187)  (0.182)  (0.182)  (0.183)  (0.156) 
Log GDP exporter  0.993*** 0.995*** 0.997*** 1.000*** 0.985*** 
(0.326)  (0.327)  (0.327)  (0.327)  (0.326) 
Log distance  -0.871***   -0.871*** -0.871***   -0.871***   -0.871*** 
(0.193)  (0.193)  (0.193)  (0.193)  (0.193) 
Common border  0.644*** 0.644*** 0.645*** 0.645*** 0.643*** 
(0.149)  (0.149)  (0.150)  (0.149)  (0.149) 
Common language  0.428*** 0.428*** 0.428*** 0.428*** 0.429*** 
(0.0782)  (0.0782)  (0.0782)  (0.0782)  (0.0782) 
Tariff index  -0.0565*** -0.0520***   -0.0531**   -0.0618*** -0.0499*** 
(0.0190)  (0.0184)  (0.0204)  (0.0194)  (0.0176) 
NTB index  -0.0784*** -0.0873***   -0.0838*** -0.0684**   -0.0924*** 
(0.0274)  (0.0280)  (0.0274)  (0.0307)  (0.0279) 
Goods ECRI  -0.00446 
(0.00359) 
Services ECRI  -0.00475*** 
(0.00135) 
Capital ECRI  -0.00323 
(0.00246) 
Financial ECRI  -0.00133 
(0.00193) 
ECRI applying to all -0.00862** 
(0.00344) 
 
Observations 3144 3144 3144 3144 3144 
Adjusted R2  0.594 0.594 0.594 0.594 0.594 
 
The dependent variable takes the form log (1+imports).  Robust standard-errors in parentheses 
are clustered by importer overtime.  Importer, exporter and year fixed effects are applied.     
* p < 0.10,  ** p < 0.05,  *** p < 0.01 
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Table 10: Disaggregated Indices using PPML 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Log GDP  SADC 1.022*** 
(0.184) 
1.087*** 
(0.163) 
0.755*** 
(0.203) 
0.795*** 
(0.172) 
0.778*** 
(0.175) 
Log GDP  exporter 2.052*** 
(0.210) 
2.047*** 
(0.209) 
2.037*** 
(0.213) 
2.041*** 
(0.208) 
2.038*** 
(0.213) 
Log distance  -0.969*** -0.968*** -0.971*** -0.971*** -0.970*** 
(0.273)  (0.274)  (0.274)  (0.274)  (0.274) 
 
Common border  0.796***  0.794*** 0.793***  0.793***  0.795*** 
(0.239)  (0.239)  (0.240)  (0.240)  (0.240) 
Common language  0.725***  0.722*** 0.724***  0.724***  0.725*** 
(0.138)  (0.137)  (0.138)  (0.138)  (0.138) 
Tariff index  -0.133*** -0.122*** -0.140*** -0.142*** -0.141*** 
(0.0296)   (0.0248)  (0.0301)   (0.0288)   (0.0298) 
NTB index  -0.0281 -0.0499 -0.0259 -0.0191 -0.0248 
(0.0354)   (0.0312)  (0.0353)   (0.0425)   (0.0360) 
Goods ECRI  -0.0137** 
(0.00590) 
Services ECRI  -0.00906*** 
(0.00152) 
Capital ECRI  -0.00117 
(0.00610) 
Financial ECRI  -0.00177 
(0.00546) 
ECRI applying to all -0.00385 
(0.00582) 
 
Observations 3144 3144 3144 3144 3144 
Adjusted R2  0.955 0.956 0.954 0.955 0.954 
 
The dependent variable is imports measured in levels.  Robust standard-errors in paren- 
theses are clustered by importer over time.  Importer, exporter and year fixed effects are 
applied. * p< 0.10,  ** p < 0.05,  *** p < 0.01 
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Table 11: Comparing CI Index and Capital ECRI across Both Models 
(1)   (2)   (3)     (4) 
OLS PPML  OLS PPML 
 
Log GDP SADC  0.832*** 0.755***  0.814*** 0.778*** 
(0.182)  (0.203)  (0.182)  (0.201) 
Log GDP exporter    0.997*** 2.037***  1.178*** 2.099*** 
(0.327)  (0.213)  (0.349)  (0.203) 
Log distance  -0.871***   -0.971*** -1.444***   -1.259*** 
(0.193)  (0.274)  (0.139)  (0.283) 
Common border  0.645*** 0.793***  0.518*** 1.003*** 
(0.150)  (0.240)  (0.164)  (0.231) 
Common language    0.428*** 0.724***  0.224*** 0.911*** 
(0.0782)  (0.138)  (0.0836)  (0.155) 
Tariff index  -0.0531**   -0.140*** -0.0588*** -0.144*** 
(0.0204)  (0.0301)   (0.0194)  (0.0294) 
NTB index  -0.0838*** -0.0259 -0.0811*** -0.0357 
(0.0274)  (0.0353)   (0.0264)  (0.0371) 
Controls on capital   -0.00323 -0.00117 
(0.00246)    (0.00610) 
Chinn-Ito index  -0.0229 0.0215 
(0.0346)  (0.0539) 
 
Observations 3144 3144 2955 2955 
Adjusted R2  0.594 0.954 0.653 0.959 
 
The  dependent variable takes  the  form  of log(1 + imports) in models  (1) 
and  (3) and  level imports for (2) and  (4).  Robust standard-errors in paren- 
theses are clustered by importer over time.  Importer, exporter and year 
fixed effects are applied. * p < 0.10,  ** p < 0.05,  *** p < 0.01 
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Table 12: SADC RTA over Both Models 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)    (5)   (6) 
OLS PPML  OLS PPML  OLS PPML 
 
Log GDP SADC  0.900*** 1.000*** 0.939*** 0.975*** 0.952*** 0.820*** 
(0.154)  (0.156)  (0.176)  (0.165)  (0.178)  (0.182) 
 
Log GDP exporter    0.902*** 2.043*** 0.986*** 2.051*** 0.807*** 2.561*** 
(0.288)  (0.205)  (0.327)  (0.210)  (0.271)  (0.376) 
 
Log distance  -0.836*** -0.993*** -0.871*** -0.970*** -0.921*** -1.051*** 
(0.182)  (0.259)  (0.193)  (0.274)  (0.203)  (0.268) 
 
Common border  0.618*** 0.763*** 0.644*** 0.795*** 0.663*** 0.719*** 
(0.139)  (0.229)  (0.149)  (0.239)  (0.152)  (0.227) 
 
Common language    0.418*** 0.739*** 0.428*** 0.724*** 0.416*** 0.672*** 
(0.0736)  (0.135)  (0.0782)  (0.138)  (0.0840)  (0.124) 
 
Tariff index  -0.0699*** -0.129*** -0.0488***  -0.123*** -0.0465*** -0.123*** 
(0.0190)  (0.0236)  (0.0179)  (0.0277)  (0.0173)  (0.0278) 
 
NTB index  -0.0830***  -0.0343 -0.0783*** 0.00352 
(0.0277)  (0.0336)  (0.0272)  (0.0382) 
 
SADC RTA  15.20 7.184 
(14.05)  (8.391) 
ECRI  -0.00802***  -0.0164***  -0.0101***  -0.0168***  -0.00912***  -0.0123*** 
(0.00303)  (0.00482)  (0.00291)  (0.00469)  (0.00296)  (0.00477) 
 
Observations 3434 3434 3144 3144 3048 3048 
Adjusted R2  0.592 0.952 0.594 0.955 0.594 0.949 
 
The  dependent variable takes  the  form  of log(1 + imports) in models  (1),  (3) and  (5) and is level imports for 
(2),  (4) and  (6).  Robust standard-errors in parentheses are clustered by importer over time. Importer, exporter 
and year fixed effects are applied. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,  *** p < 0.01 
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Table 13: Interaction between ECRI and Corruption Measure 
 
 (1) 
OLS 
(2) 
PPML 
Log GDP  SADC 0.966*** 0.897*** 
 (0.207) (0.248) 
Log GDP  exporter 1.016*** 2.034*** 
 (0.352) (0.223) 
Log distance -0.857*** -0.949*** 
 (0.197) (0.276) 
Common  border 0.651*** 0.802*** 
 (0.154) (0.244) 
Common  language 0.423*** 0.718*** 
 (0.0782) (0.139) 
Tariff index -0.0602*** -0.130*** 
 (0.0181) (0.0272) 
NTB index -0.0654** -0.0494 
 (0.0290) (0.0367) 
Corruption -0.0806 -0.192 
 (0.196) (0.236) 
Corruption*ECRI 0.00307 0.00770 
 (0.00380) (0.00612) 
ECRI -0.00622 -0.00488 
 (0.00501) (0.0104) 
Observations 3029 3029 
Adjusted  R2 0.588 0.955 
The dependent variable takes the form of log(1 + imports) in model (1) 
and level imports for (2).  Robust standard-errors in parentheses are 
clustered by importer over time.   Importer, exporter and year fixed 
effects are applied. * p < 0.10,  ** p < 0.05,  *** p < 0.01 
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